

# Section 5 : Metaphysics

## Truthmakers and Explanation

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I argue for three claims :

1. It is a mistake to think that truthmaker theory needs to be motivated by recourse to the thesis that for every true sentence there must be some explanation of why it is true. Opponents of truthmaker theory are right in saying that explanations not citing truthmakers may do this job.

Opponents of truthmaker theory neglect, however, two other ways in which truthmaker theory is explanatory.

2. Truthmaker theory is an explanatory theory of truth (not : truths), claiming that truth is a derelativisation of a metaphysically prior cross-categorial relation of truthmaking. Opponents of truthmaker theory have to tell us what truth is. Moreover, this explanatory rôle of truthmaker theory provides a strong argument for truthmaker maximalism. Non-maximalist truthmaker theorists are committed to the claim that there are two ways for something to be true, and face the difficult task to explain why these are two ways for something to be *true*.

3. It is a mistake to think that the explanations of truths offered by truthmaker theory are claims to the effect that they have such-and-such truthmakers. Consider :

- (1) Sam is a dog because “Sam is a dog.” is made true by Sam.
- (2) “Sam is a dog” is true because it is made true by Sam.
- (3) “Sam is a dog” is true because of Sam.

As opponents of truthmaker theory have pointed out, both (1) and (2) are false. (3), however, is true and provides an explanation of why “Sam is a dog” is true