
Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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Preliminaries: the business of philosophy

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- The business of philosophy is to make sense of the world, both as we find it and as it is in itself.
- Part of this account is to provide explanations.
- Such explanations are of a special, ill-understood type. They are neither (purely) causal nor (purely) conceptual.

An opiniated history

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And he ended up with a world of states of affairs.

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General defect: commitment is to domains only; Newman problem.

Truthmaking: the basics

Ontological seriousness:

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These two tenets are interrelated: the relationality of truth means that the grounds must enter into true ascriptions of truth; the groundedness means that the other relatum of such ascriptions must be of an ontological, rather than say of an epistemological or representational nature.



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- (B) Dependence cannot be characterised modally.
- (C) Specific focus on existence facts.

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- 3 It does not solve problem (B): It does not rule out malignant necessitators.

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So far, so good.

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Denying truthmaker maximalism (every truth has a truthmaker) commits us to dualism about truth.

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(6) **is** the statement that Sam is the truthmaker of “Sam is a dog”.

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Truthmaking, as explanation by things, is cross-categorical (solving problem (A)), non-modal (solving problem (B)) and does not privilege existence *facts* (solving 'problem' C).

Beyond dogs. . . – to facts?

From TTT to states of affairs:

If it is said that the truthmaker for a truth could have failed to make the truth true, then we will surely think that the alleged truthmaker was insufficient by itself and requires to be supplemented in some way. A contingently sufficient truthmaker will be true only in circumstances that obtain in this world. But then these circumstances, whatever they are, must be added to give the full truthmaker. (Armstrong 1997: 116)

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This presupposes necessitarianism. Better have contingent truthmaking than states of affairs.

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- mathematical: 2 is between 1 and 3 because of 1,2,3.
- metaphysical: “Humphrey possibly wins” is true because because of his (winning) counterpart.

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Mulligan (2004: 407) bites this bullet.

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- Pleonastic facts mirror sentences (thus problem (A) is not solved).
- The dependence of truth on reality is not dependence between facts: the latter is constitution, the first is grounding.
- Pleonastic facts do not exist. Nothing really existing contains things such as negations and implications.

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The hard work has only just begun.