

Exemplification, parthood and constitution

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Different points of contact between universals and aspect-theory

Respects of similarity: a qua F resembles b but a qua G does not resemble b .

Multiple location: F qua exemplified by a is 2 metres apart from F qua exemplified by b : "...a universal insofar as it is in one location, is not in another. Insofar as it is in one location, it is separate from (spatially discontinuous from) itself insofar as it is in the other." (Baxter 2001a: 451)

Exemplification: "Here is the proposal in brief: the non-relational tie is the identity of an aspect of a universal with an aspect of a particular. If you think of aspects as parts, then the non-relational tie is the 'partial identity' of particular and universals. That's putting it Armstrong's suggestive way [making reference to (Armstrong 1997: 17)]. The aspect is the part they have in common." (Baxter 2001a: 453)[†]

Relations: "Abelard insofar as he loves Heloise is partially identical with Loving, in virtue of being partially identical with Loving-by. Heloise insofar as Abelard loves her is partially identical with Loving in virtue of being partially identical with Loving-of. In general the blanks filled by noun phrases in relation predicates, if they correspond to anything, will correspond to aspects of a relation. [...] Notice that, on this account there is a necessary connection between Abelard insofar as he loves Heloise and Heloise insofar as Abelard loves her. Neither aspect can exist without the other. This connection is due to the fact that necessarily, *Abelard* loves Heloise if and only if Abelard loves *Heloise*." (Baxter 2001a: 457-8)

Nature of universals: "[The u]niversal is better thought of as various particulars insofar as they are the same way, counted as identical. The similar aspects of distinct particulars are counted as identical. The differing aspects of the same particular are counted as distinct, in this count of universals [which distinguishes necessarily co-instantiated universals]. They help compose different universals." (Baxter 2001a: 456) Universals, then, are particulars, or better "particulars strictly identical in a different count" (Baxter 2001a: 456)

Different points of contact between particulars and aspect-theory

Parts are aspects: "...to take many things to be a single thing is to take them to be aspects of a single thing, in my sense of "aspect" (Baxter 2001b: 600, fn. 14) ; "On standard conceptions, the [proper] parts are all numerically distinct from each other, and each is numerically distinct from the whole

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[†]Armstrong (2004: 142) says of Baxter's theory that its great attraction is "that it involves nothing but the particulars and universals": "Because the suggested link between the two is partial identity, any need for a fundamental tie, a copula, or what have you, seems to be eliminated. All the trouble that this tie has caused to those of us who accept universals alongside particulars, the tie that so many others use as a major reproach against the postulation of universals, is at a stroke removed."

they compose. Aspects aren't like this. They are numerically identical with each other and the whole. Think of parts likewise." (Baxter 2001a: 453)

Aspects and truthmaking: "...in a true attribution of loose identity, there are really two attributions: that of the underlying truth-making relation – the relation which makes the attribution true – and that of the feigned relation, viz. identity, strict, absolute identity. [...] The fact that the feigned relation is false of the relata, and different from the truth-making relation, is why such cases are called cases of loose identity." (Baxter 2001b: 596)

Perception of aspects: "A collection is immediately perceived in virtue of immediately perceiving a member. The collection as a unit is just the thing which all the parts are identical with in the vulgar acceptance of identity. If a part is immediately perceived, then anything that is identical with it is immediately perceived. This would be the part itself on philosophical usage of 'identical with', but would be the whole collection on vulgar usage. In this sense, then, immediately perceiving a part just is immediately perceiving the whole." (Baxter 1991: 96)

Extension: "Think of the locations of each of the parts [of some particular]. Think of the whole as a concrete universal. Then the whole is wholly present in each of these locations, just like any universal. As before, we can distinguish the whole insofar as it is in one location from itself insofar as it is in another. These are aspects of it. There is no further work for parts to do in this context. We can regard the whole as a single thing, yet get all the complexity numerically distinct parts could give us. Thus we can think of spatial parts of a particular whole as aspects of a concrete universal." (Baxter 2001a: 453)

References

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