Qua qua qua

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Fine Fest, Varano Borghi, August 1, 2013

1 What qua objects could be

General notion:

Essence a qua F is *essentially* F.
Existence a qua F has different modal and temporal persistence conditions than its base and any other qua object a qua G (for F and G not necessarily coextensive).
Dependence a qua F depends existentially on the state of affairs of a's being F.

Fine's 1982/1999 theory: A qua object, according to Fine, is a special kind of intensional entity, consisting of a particular, say a (its 'basis'), together with a property, say F (its 'gloss'), and denoted by "a qua F". For any particular a and any property F there is such a qua object, which exists at times and in worlds when and where a is F. Qua objects in Fine's sense are intensional entities: they are identical only if they have the same glosses and they are distinct from their bases, though they have them as constituents: "the qua object should be regarded as some sort of amalgam of the given object and the property..." (p. 100). He's wary not to assign them too high a grade of being:

> "The acts, as qua objects, are in an obvious sense artificial and derivative. They are not genuinely 'out there' in the world, but are formed from what is out there by means of an alliance with a purely intensional element. (It is tempting to say that they are partly formed in our own minds, but this would be too psychologistic)." (Fine 1982: 103)

Fine's conditions on qua objects:

Existence a qua F exists at t in w iff a is F at t in w
Identity (i) a qua F = b qua G iff $a = b \wedge F = G$; (ii) $a \neq a$ qua F
Inheritance If a qua F exists at t in w and G is normal, a qua F is G iff a is G

Identity conditions derivative on states:

Identity The rigid embodiments $a, b, c \ldots / R$ and $a', b', c' \ldots / R'$ are the same iff the state of $a, b, c \ldots$ standing in the relation R is the same as the state of $a', b', c' \ldots$ standing in the relation R.
Parthood : The objects $a, b, c, \ldots$ and the relation R are (timeless) parts of $a, b, c/R$.

Connection with counts:

> "An especially important class of cases are those in which the principle of embodiment is a property P rather than a polyadic relation R. The rigid embodiment is then of the form "a/P" and may be read as "a qua F" or as "a under the description P." An airline passenger, for example, is not the same as the person who is the passenger since, in counting the passengers who pass through an airport on a given weekend, we may legitimately count the same person several times. This therefore suggests that we should take an airline passenger to be someone under the description of being flown on such and such a flight. And similarly for mayors and judges and other "personages" of this sort." (Fine 1999, 67-68)

Lewis 1971/1983/2003 theory: Start with ordinary objects under competing descriptions. Something b in a possible world v is a counterpart of a in w iff a would be b if w turned out to be v. Counterpart relations depend on overall intrinsic and extrinsic similarity and sometimes on similarity-in-a-given-respect:

"...counterpart relations are a matter of over-all resemblance in a variety of respects. If we vary the relative importances of different respects of similarity and dissimilarity, we will get different counterpart relations. Two respects of similarity and dissimilarity among enduring things are, first, personhood and personal traits, and, second, bodyhood and bodily traits. If we assign great weight to the former, we get the *personal counterpart* relation. Only a person, or something very like a person, can resemble a person in respect of personhood and personal traits enough to be his personal counterpart. But if we assign great weight to the latter, we get the *bodily counterpart* relation. Only a body, or something very like a body, can resemble a body in respect to bodyhood and bodily traits enough to be its bodily counterpart." (Lewis 1971: 51-52)

This is easily extended to a theory of modal continuants (Lewis 1983: 40-42). Long qua black is "none other than Long himself" and "differs from him in essence":

"...[Long] has different essences under different counterpart relations. The name 'Long' evokes one counterpart relation; the (novel) name "Long qua black" evokes another. The counterparts of Long qua black / Long under the second counterpart relation are just those of his counterparts under the first counterpart relation that are black." (Lewis 2003, 31)

Ludovican conditions on qua objects:

- **Existence** a qua F exists at t in w iff F is an intrinsic property of a at t in w

- **Identity** a qua $F = a$

- **Inheritance** the counterparts of a qua F are the counterparts of a that are F

Aristotle's theory: Qua objects are parts of ordinary objects. Restrict glosses to intrinsic properties and allow for structural properties (intrinsic to the mereological fusion of the relata of a relation). Musical-Coriscus and Coriscus are one in number but not in being: two things counted as one.

Baxter's theory: Qua objects ("aspects") are cross-count identities:

There are two kinds of identity. One kind holds on different standards. It is the kind that holds between one thing (counted on some standard) and one thing (counted on that same standard). The other kind of identity holds between distinct things (counted on a strict standard) and a single thing (counted on a looser standard). It is identity because the several things (counting strictly) are identical with each other (counting loosely). (Baxter 1988: 576)
The underlying idea is that an entity can differ from itself without contradiction. Something can be true of one aspect of an entity that is false of another aspect of it, even though its aspects are numerically identical with it. (Baxter 2001: 44) ...to take many things to be a single thing is to take them to be aspects of a single thing, in my sense of "aspect". (Baxter 2001a: 600, fn. 14)

2   Finding a place for them

Fine (2001: 3) distinguishes two notions of metaphysical reality:

what is factual : "...metaphysical reality is to be identified with what is "objective" or "factual". The antirealist, on this conception, denies that there are any facts "out there" in virtue of which the propositions of a given domain might be true. The propositions of the domain are not in the "business" of stating such facts; they serve merely to indicate our engagement with the world without stating, in objective fashion, how the world is. As familiar examples of such a position, we have expressivism in ethics, according to which ethical judgements are mere expressions of attitude; formalism in mathematics, according to which mathematical statements are mere moves within a system of formal rules; and instrumentalism in science, according to which scientific theories are mere devices for the prediction and control of our environment."

what is fundamental : "…metaphysical reality is to be identified with what is "irreducible" or "fundamental". On this view, reality is constituted by certain irreducible or fundamental facts; and in denying reality to a given domain, the antirealist is claiming that its facts are all reducible to facts of some other sort. Thus the ethical naturalist will claim that every ethical fat is reducible to naturalistic facts, the logicist that every mathematical fact is reducible to facts of logic, and the phenomenalist that every fact about the external world is reducible to facts about our sense-date."

For our purposes, the two notions may be distinguished by the relations expressivists and physicalists claim to hold between the domains of moral and psychological, and psychological and physical facts respectively:

physicalism : the mental is nothing over and above the physical, the world is fundamentally physical, attributions of mental predicates have physical truthmakers;

expressivism : moral language is not descriptive, not in the business of stating facts; to attribute wrongness to an action is to express disapproval of it.

It is a mistake to think that physicalism is committed to some claims about moral vocabulary or about what attributions of mental properties are 'about', and it is also a mistake to think that the perspectival character of moral thinking that motivates the expressivist has implications about the nature of values. The two positions sketched rather correspond to various brands of reductionism and relativism:

reductionism / eliminativism : psychological language is definable in terms of the physical; saying that Sam is in pain is attributing to him a certain brain-state; mental generalisations are not law-like, they do not carve nature at its joints;

subject relativism / buck-passing : what makes a certain act wrong is that we (or: idealised subjects) do (or: should) disapprove of it; moral properties supervene on psychological properties.

At least *prima facie*, the two distinctions thus cross-cut:

	factual	non-factual
unreal	psychology	morality
real	physics	

Contrary to Fine, I think that there are two relations corresponding to the two notions of metaphysical reality:

constitution : If something is constituted by something else, it is a *manifestation* of the latter, an *aspect* of it, perhaps an *abstraction* of it. It is natural to take manifestations of other things to be "less objective" than them, "less substantial", and it is a natural thought that these entities of a "lesser sort" do not *really* exist, that our ontological commitment is only to what grounds them, especially if "metaphysical reality is to be identified with what is "objective" or "factual"".

determination : What determines what? If a / F / a's being F determines b / G / b's being G either qualitatively, essentially or existentially, the first relatum is *responsible* for the second being such-and-such, being the thing it is, being. It is so responsible because it *makes* it so. In this sense, we may say that particulars are determined by the universals they exemplify, boundaries are determined by what they are boundaries of, tropes are determined by their bearers. Even someone may restrict our notion of metaphysical reality to "what is "irreducible" or "fundamental"", saying that some entities are determined by others *presupposes*, rather than does away with, the claim that they exist.

To the two metaphysical structuring relations, correspond two versions of Moore's open-question argument:

why $A \rightsquigarrow B$? : why should feature A give rise to feature B? in virtue of what is it that something that is A also is B? (compare Lewis' question to Armstrong: in virtue of what does $N(F, G)$ ground $\forall x(Fx \rightarrow Gx)$?)

why $\forall x(x \rightsquigarrow A \rightarrow x \rightsquigarrow B)$**?** : why should what makes something A *ipso facto* make it B? (compare Eutyphro's question: why should what makes the God love him also make him pious?)

The main difference between constitution and determination may be characterised metaphorically by their 'direction'. Determination is a vertical relation, as it were, structuring reality and non-reality in different layers, that are more or less fundamental. The physicalist says that psychological facts are determined by physical facts, but may still believe that they are real: it is just that he does not believe they are fundamental.

Constitution, on the other hand, may hold horizontally, among equally fundamental things. The expressivist who believes that this baby's being tortured being morally wrong is grounded in what moral sentiments we should have with respect to it does not have to claim that our (obligatory) moral sentiments *determine* the wrongness of the torturing.

Fine on the metaphysical neutrality of grounding. Even though he says that "there is no need to suppose that a ground is some fact or entity in the world or that the notion of ground is inextricably connected with the concept of truth" Fine (2001: 16) and says someone claiming that conjunctive facts are grounded in their conjuncts may be adopting "a metaphysically neutral stand on whether there really are conjunctive facts", he says in "Guide to Ground" that "we are not inclined to think of the truth of a grounded proposition as a *further fact* over and above its grounds, even though it may be distinct from its grounds and even though it may itself be a real fact".

Even though Fine distinguishes the questions of grounding and determination/fundamentality, he holds that questions of factuality reduce to questions of fundamentality, because he assumes that the disagreement between a factualist and a non-factualist about some proposition concerns the factuality of some constituent of that proposition – a notion that is defined in terms of the factuality of all the propositions in which the constituent (a particular or property) has 'primary employment'. It seems to me that there is *another* notion of fundamentality of 'constituents' that is not derivative from the status of propositions in which they occur. It is in terms of this other notion, it seems to me, that the physicalist about the mental (contrary to the expressivist about the moral) frames his thesis. On this, not Fine's understanding, of "fundamental", Fine's principle (g) is false:

> [W]henever a constituent occurs in a true basic factual proposition and also occurs essentially in some true factual proposition, then any ground for the latter must contain the constituent. (Fine 2001: 18)

Fine justifies this principle in terms of his notion of "fundamentality" as follows:

> If a given constituent C occurs in a true basic factual proposition then it must be a fundamental element of reality. But if some true factual proposition contains C essentially, it must be true in virtue of some feature of C. But given that C is a fundamental element of reality, this feature of C cannot be grounded in something that did not involve C. (Fine 2001: 21)

I disagree with the second sentence of this quote: It does not follow from a proposition's being factual that it wears it's truthmaker on its sleeve, as it were. "Socrates exemplifies redness", for example, may well be true, factual, and contain "exemplifies" essentially. But it does not follow, on my understanding of fundamentality, that "Socrates exemplifies redness" cannot be grounded in " Socrates is red".

Distinguishing the two notions, and the two correlative notions of metaphysical explanation, I thus disagree with Fine (2001: 22) that "in providing the ground for a given proposition, one is explaining, in the most metaphysically satisfying manner, what it is that makes it true". The question of truthmakers is a question of determination, of what *determines* the truth-value of the truth-bearer in question. If a makes it true that p, and if p grounds q, then a will also make it true that q – but this is not to say that the statement that p grounds q *already* settles the question what truthmaker "q" has, or indeed the question whether it has any truthmaker (is true).

Fine's notion of reduction presupposes that what is reduced is not real, but I do not see why we could not have reduction among the real as well. Fine explicates his notion of reduction in terms of closeness to reality:

> ...a necessary condition for the proposition P to reduce to the propositions Q, R, ...is for it to be grounded in those other propositions; and a necessary and sufficient condition for Q, R, ...to be closer to reality than P in such is a case is that P be unreal and each of Q, R, ...either be real or "en route" to what is real. But the latter is presumably just a matter of the proposition's being grounded in what is real. (Fine 2001: 26)

It seems to me that it is enough for Q to be 'closer to reality' than P that Q is further down the route to what is real – and this certainly may be the case if P is real, but less real than Q.