

Extrinsic entities

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Extrinsic essences

Extrinsic entities are entities that exist extrinsically, i.e. that it is either extrinsically true of them that they exist or that they exemplify the property *existence* extrinsically. Some, but not all, essentially dependent entities (entities x such that it is essential to x to be R -related to at least some other entity) are extrinsic; some may also be the intrinsic grounds of their essential relations: God, e.g., may be intrinsically such that it is of His essence to create the world (or the best of all possible worlds), but He is not an extrinsic entity. Some, but not all, grounded entities are extrinsic; some may also be the intrinsic grounds of the grounding relation they stand in. A disposition may be intrinsically such that it grounds its being manifested, where this itself is a grounding relation. But manifestations are not extrinsic entities.

Can we say that all *other* essentially dependent entities, and all *other* grounded entities are extrinsic? This would be:

ont dep $\forall x(\exists y(\Box_x xRy \wedge \Diamond(\exists z(Dupl(z, x) \wedge \neg\Box_z zRy)) \rightarrow x \text{ is extrinsic})$: extrinsically essentially related entities are extrinsic.

grounded $\forall x(\exists y(Gr(Ey, Ex) \wedge \neg Gr(Ex, Gr(Ey, Ex)) \rightarrow x \text{ is extrinsic})$: extrinsically grounded entities are extrinsic.

To get sufficient conditions, we have to combine the two: x is extrinsic iff it is true in virtue of the essence of x that there is some distinct thing, y , in which the existence of x is grounded. Extrinsic entities cannot exist lonely and they cannot exist without being grounded. In this sense, they do not have “their entire existential fundament in themselves” and are what Ingarden (1964-1965: §12) calls “heteronomous” (*seinsheteronom, heteronomiczny*). They are also “derivative” (*seinsabgeleitet, pochodny*) insofar as they “by [their] essence, can exist only by being created by another object”.¹

The grounding relation between the extrinsic entity and its base may be contingent, *ceteris paribus* and *ceteris absentibus*. It may well be that the existence of the base by itself is not sufficient for the extrinsic entity to exist.

Extrinsic entities are essentially grounded in their grounds. They are grounded, i.e. non-fundamental, and they have an extrinsic essence, as it is part of their nature to be so grounded. Their essence, however, may still be non-relational, if they include their ground as a part, as many, or perhaps all of them do.

Is everything that extrinsically has some of its essential properties an extrinsic entity or could there be fundamental (ungrounded) or only accidentally grounded entities that also has some of its essential properties extrinsically? I do not see how this could be possible, but I have no argument. **Ideas?**

If everything that has an extrinsic essence is an extrinsic thing, then perhaps we could say that things that are not extrinsic (i.e. things that have an intrinsic essence) are substances. We would then have a dichotomy between extrinsic things and substances, relative to whether they exemplify some of their essential properties extrinsically or not.

Such a dichotomy does not exclude non-fundamental substances, but it does require that their are grounded holds not in virtue of them. What does it then hold in virtue of? Non-fundamental substances are grounded either in other substances or in extrinsic things.

- In the first case, they are so grounded in virtue of their ground, of which they are the ‘metaphysical effects’: all by itself, the substantial ground is able to bring about, by some type of metaphysical super-causation, its substantial effect. The properties in virtue of which the ground grounds the grounding may be intrinsic or extrinsic. Extrinsic grounding of grounding relations by their grounds is not excluded. a may be extrinsically the ground of the grounding of b by a .
- Is the second case, some substance grounded in an extrinsic thing, possible at all? I do not see why not. **But perhaps you do?**

Fundamental entities must be substances, but again they may be extrinsic grounds, as long as this is only accidental to them. This follows from the argument below. The argument below also shows that nothing that has an extrinsic essence can be a substance, i.e., assuming the dichotomy, that everything that has an extrinsic essence is an extrinsic thing, i.e. extrinsically grounded.

Suppose that a grounds b . In what is this grounded?

- If both a and b are substances, then a is the ground. That it is grounded in a cannot be essential to b in this case: it must be compatible with b ’s nature that it be grounded in something else or not grounded at all.
- If only a , but not b is a substance, then b is the ground. It only follows that b is an extrinsic entity if b essentially is the ground.
- If neither a nor b is a substance, then it is also grounded in b . Again, it only follows that b is an extrinsic entity if b essentially is the ground.
- If a is not a substance, but b is, then

1. ? : 215-216 claims that Ingarden thinks derivativeness is entailed by heteronomy because he identifies the external existential fundament of some thing with its creator.

- if a is the ground, then a is an extrinsic thing only if a essentially is the ground. But how could a non-substance be essentially such that it grounds a substance? **Perhaps you see how.**
- if b is the ground, then it cannot be essential to b to be so grounded. But can it be accidental to a substance to be grounded in some non-substance? (This was the second query above).
- Fortunately, a third option is available. The ground in virtue of which a substance is grounded in a non-substance is the form of the substance: b is a hylomorphic compound, and the grounding relation between it and its non-substantial ground a is grounded in bs form.

Substances (ontologically independent things) have intrinsic essences

Suppose y is a substance that is essentially F and F is extrinsic to y . This means that there is an intrinsic duplicate y' of y that is not F . Because y' is not F and y is essentially F , what it is to be y' and what it is to be y are two different (sets, conjunctions of) properties: the latter but not the first entails F . But the change from the first to the second is, by definition, a Cambridge change: y could become what it is to be y' simply in virtue of a change in something else. Ultimately, this has to be a change in the intrinsic property of something (because all Cambridge change piggy-backs on intrinsic change) and this change has to be excluded by every real definition of y .

Thus all real definitions of y mention something x numerically different from y . They do so (i) by ascribing to this x some property F intrinsic to x such that it is in virtue of x being F that y is what it is and (ii) by ascribing to x and y some relation R . So y is what it is partly in virtue of some x having the intrinsic property F . I distinguish three cases in descending order of personal conviction:

- If all real definitions mention the same x , then y is essentially dependent (identity dependent) on x and cannot be what it is unless x exists (for x has to exist to be F , if F is intrinsic to x).
 - On the standard non-modal conception of essence, essential properties are *de re* necessary. So essential dependence implies ontological dependence. On the standard conception, an essentially dependent thing cannot be a substance.
 - If we allow for contingent essences, y could still exist if x would not exist, or not be F . But y would not then be what it is. So suppose y has its extrinsic essence contingently. It would still not be a substance, because something else z , of which it is a proper part, has a better claim to be a substance. ‘Construct’ z by recursion. If x has an intrinsic essence, $z = x + y$. If x has an extrinsic essence in virtue of being essentially dependent on w , then $z = x + y + w$. If x has an extrinsic essence in virtue of being generically essentially dependent on some G , then z is the sum of x , of y and of the disjunctive sum of all G s. z has its essence intrinsically, because everything it depends on is included among its parts. Nothing is a substance if it is a proper part of something that has a better claim to be a substance.
- If different real definitions mention different things, y is only generically essentially dependent on there being F s: it is essential to y that there is an x such that Fx and Rxy . If F is an intrinsic property, then it is an intrinsic property of the world that there are F s (for intrinsic properties of parts are intrinsic to the whole). If y is a substance, then it could be a world and have the same intrinsic properties that it actually has, for a substance is a combinatorial unit and could exist alone. So y could have the property of being such that there are F s intrinsically. If it had it intrinsically, it would also intrinsically be such that it stands in relation R to some F . Otherwise, it would have a duplicate which does not stand in relation R to any F , even though every duplicate is accompanied by F s. It is, however, hard to see why it could fail to stand in relation R to any of the F s. So if y were a world, then it would have its essence intrinsically. It would also be a duplicate, so y has its generically dependent essence intrinsically.

So if y has an extrinsic essence, y is not a substance. Substances have their essential properties intrinsically.

Perhaps there is a more direct way: To be a substance is to be ontologically independent, ie to be able to exist alone, be a world. If essential properties are *de re* necessary, and every extrinsic property is relational, then it would not just be a world but also have the same essential properties it actually has. So one of this property would be relational but it could be relational only with respect to some of its parts. But then it would still be intrinsic. So it is intrinsic also in the actual world.²

Application: Priority Monism

⁵The only difference between Schaffer’s world and God is that the latter is unchanging – but in what sense does the first change?

Parthood-is-priority (PP) is the thesis that (i) for all x , if y is a part of x , then y ontologically depends on x and that (ii) there is a sum of everything. Coupled with some composition principles, PP entails Priority Monism (PM), that everything ontologically depends on Porky the Pig, the thing of which everything is a part.

A possible equivocation?

In particular I will assume that there is a world and that it has proper parts. More precisely, I assume that there is a maximal actual concrete object – the cosmos – of which all actual concrete objects are parts. I should stress that I am only concerned with actual concrete objects. Possibilia, abstracta, and actual concreta in categories other than object are not my concern (deities and spirits, if such there be, are not my concern either). When I speak of the world - and defend the monistic thesis that the whole is prior to its parts – I am speaking of the material cosmos and its planets, pebbles, particles, and other proper parts. (Schaffer 2010b: 33)

...given the foundationalist assumption of a well-founded partial dependence ordering [...], Monism is equivalent to the thesis that every proper part of the cosmos depends on the cosmos. Suppose that Monism holds. Given well-foundedness, every actual concrete object must be either basic or dependent on some basic object. By the definition of Monism, the

². If we allow for contingent essential properties, we have to assume that being a substance is an essential property but not among them. So in the world where the substance exists alone it is perhaps no longer the thing it actually is, but it is still a substance. If we in addition allow for non-relational extrinsic properties, we also have to assume that being a substance is not just an essential, but also an intrinsic property of things.

cosmos is the only such basis. So every proper part of the cosmos must depend on the cosmos. In the other direction, suppose that every proper part of the cosmos depends on the cosmos. By the asymmetry of dependence, the cosmos cannot then depend on any of its proper parts. By irreflexivity the cosmos cannot depend on itself. So the cosmos must be basic. Moreover nothing else can be basic since by supposition everything else is dependent on the cosmos. So there can be one and only one basic actual concrete object, namely the cosmos. (Schaffer 2010b: 42–43)

Depending on whether we read “the cosmos” as a proper name or a definite description, Monism is one or rather a family of theses.

There’s also a problem: Porky only does the job *given* it’s everything:³

“...any difference in the truth of <there are no dragons> must stem from some difference in what is fundamental. If there can only be one fundament, and it is the world, then any difference in the truth of <there are no dragons> can only possibly stem from a difference in the world. Fixing the one fundament as actuality fixes the world, and in so doing fixes the truth of <there are no dragons>.” (Schaffer 2010a: 321)

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3. Tallant (2010: 800) makes the related (and rather obvious) mistake to think that the mere existence of a totality (rather than it’s being a totality of a certain kind) does provide an Armstrongian truthmaker for negative existentials.