

Kantian Aspects

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I Knowing what cannot be known

I.1 A distinction of form and matter

Kant was not the first to give a two-component account of the objects of our empirical knowledge. Among many others, Aristotle perhaps most famously made a distinction between what we can know of a substance, say Socrates, and what else is required to pertain to the thing our knowledge is *of*. Socrates *is* (identical to) some matter enformed by a human soul, which determines not just how his matter has to be organised for him to exist, but all other of his essential properties as well. It is his form, and his form only, that we can know of Socrates. There are, however, theoretical reasons to take Socrates to be not just his form: among them is the requirement that there is, or at least may be, substantial change (coming into being and ceasing to exist of substances) and that even such substantial change must be a change *in* something underlying it (for nothing can come out of nothing). In addition to the content of our knowledge (Socrates' form), there is also its object, distinct from the form, something the form is a form of – but of this, by itself, we cannot know anything.

Such a two-component account has the important theoretical advantage of having a good chance at fulfilling two desiderata on any account of human cognition that pull us in opposite directions:

anchoring By postulating an in itself unknowable object of empirical knowledge, we explain why the question whether two known contents are *about* the same thing has an objective, albeit perhaps unknowable, answer.

reaching out The form known is the form of Socrates; knowledge is a real relation between two really existing things, along which its content is identically transmitted.

The second component explains the relational component of our knowledge, while the first accounts for the objectivity of its content – nice to have if you can get it. A theory such as the one caricatured above, however, also immediately faces a problem of intelligibility, the two flip-sides of which can be characterised as follows:

veil what justification, if any, do we have to go 'beyond' what we know to be all there is to know? what is it, about the form, that makes it the form of Socrates? how can our knowledge be particular?

homonymy what is characterised as unknown is not wholly so: we do know, after all, that there is matter, that we do not, and cannot, know it and that it underlies what we may know – in what terms is the distinction required here between the way matter is known and the way it is not to be drawn? what is it in the matter that underlies this distinction?

The need to answer these problems may lead us, and perhaps led Aristotle, to refinements of both the knowability and the unknowability thesis:

knowability The form we know is assumed to be in a certain sense 'transparent': we are said to know Socrates *through* his form, or perhaps *by* knowing his form, we know the form *as* the form of Socrates. To claim the advantage of **anchoring**, we have to find a way around **veil**. This is to be done by an account of the form as 'transparent'.

unknowability The matter is unknowable only *by itself*, insofar as we viciously abstract its form away from it; as the matter that is organised by the form, it is known after all – only *as* matter it is unknowable. To claim the advantage of **reachability**, we have to avoid **homonymy**, i.e. to give an account of matter

as ‘intelligible’.

Together, these refinements constitute an important departure from the original picture. The matter/form distinction is no longer paralleled (and to a certain extent explained) by the distinction between regarding Socrates with respect to his knowability and regarding him in abstraction from his knowability: *both* for matter and form we now make a distinction between two perspectives. The form, insofar as it is knowable, is detached from Socrates, relatively universal with respect to him; only insofar as it is unknown, it is a form of him. The matter, insofar as it is knowable, is what the form is a form of, i.e. matter organised, structured and governed by the form. Insofar as it is not knowable, it is the theoretically inferred substratum of change, including the change that is perception.

Instead of a simple two-component picture, we end up with a more complicated four-factor analysis that threatens to undermine the initial appeal of the theory: knowable are only the form regarded as ‘standing alone’ and the matter as ‘being combined’. This combination, however, remains elusive, its possibility just assumed and not argued for. We are simply asked to believe in the reality of a mysterious relation, one of its relata, the matter as ‘standing alone’, is necessarily unknown and the putative result of which, the form ‘as combined’, beyond our cognitive reach. We need to do better.

1.2 The Copernican turn

I find it interpretatorily useful to situate Kant’s project as partly a response to such concerns, motivated by at least two main departures from the picture caricatured above:

realism The ‘forms’ we know need themselves some anchoring: their being the forms of objects we can come to know through knowing them should not just be presupposed, but has to be demonstrated – it has to be shown that there may be something ‘given’ that they inform, i.e. the (at least epistemic) possibility that they are entirely free-floating and ‘fantastic’ has to be ruled out. As mathematicians need constructions and natural scientists need experiments, metaphysicians need to demonstrative the objective reality of what they claim makes things intelligible, or otherwise their knowledge claims remain of concepts only and cannot be synthetic if true.

idealism Matter cannot be just the we-know-not-what that underlies substantial change. As it is the subject matter of the natural sciences (and, for Kant, of mathematics as well) that claim to possess a priori synthetic knowledge of it, it has to be brought within the domain of the knowable. Our empirical knowledge is as much of matter as it is of form; matter itself is intelligible, and may be partly known independently of experience.

Kant’s crucial idea, so proudly announced in the Preface to the First *Critique*, is to forsake the form/matter distinction for a distinction of perspectives, of considering both form and matter only with respect to their knowability:

Man versuche es daher einmal [...], **dass wir annehmen**, die Gegenstände müssen sich nach unserem Erkenntnis richten ...(Bxvi)

...**ich nehme an**, die Gegenstände, oder, welches einerlei ist, die Erfahrung, in welcher sie allein (als gegebene Gegenstände) erkannt werden, richte sich nach diesen Begriffen ...(Bxvii)

...wenn man **annimmt**, unsere Vorstellung der Dinge, wie sie uns gegeben werden, richte sich nicht nach diesen, als Dingen an sich selbst, sondern diese Gegenstände vielmehr, als Erscheinungen, richten sich nach unserer Vorstellungsart (Bxx, emphases mine)

It seems to me clear that Kant here presents the Copernican turn as a reconceptualisation of the objects of our knowledge, as the introduction of a new way of considering them, and *not* as a truth-evaluable claim about their nature.¹ The claim, in sharp distinction from the hylomorphic picture sketched above, is *not* that

¹In this, he sees the analogy to the ‘revolutions’ he sees in the natural sciences and in mathematics. The inventor of the method of proof in mathematics, Kant says (Bxii), realised that he should inquire into (nachspüren) what follows necessary from his own construction, rather than just consider its departure and end points (the pure concept, and the visible figure). The revolutionaries of natural science are lauded for having discovered the method of testing hypotheses by crucial experiments. In both cases, their achievements do not lie in presenting or defending a new view of what their sciences are about, but rather in realising that their investigations should be based on models of the phenomena, rather than the phenomena themselves, the latter of which lacks the systematicity that exhibits lawful structure and is a “blosses Herumtappen”.

things like Socrates have a dual nature, are constituted by or composed of both knowable and unknowable elements. The claim is rather that we know things about Socrates only insofar as we assume that he conforms to (richtet sich nach) our cognitive faculties (Vorstellungsart), i.e. both (i) that we do know things about him, so regarded, and (ii) that the only things we know about him are such that we know them in this way.

The project will thus be two-fold: an analytical investigation of the nature of the knowledge we have, characterising it as of appearances that are governed and constituted by synthetic truths a priori; a dialectical investigation into the domain of the unknowable, considering – by way of an “experiment of reason” and in the place of real experiments as in the natural sciences –,

...dass dieselben Gegenstände einerseits als Gegenstände der Sinne und des Verstandes für die Erfahrung, andererseits aber doch als Gegenstände, die man bloss denkt, allenfalls für die isolierte und über Erfahrungsgrenze hinausstrebende Vernunft, mithin von zwei verschiedenen Seiten betrachtet werden können ... (Bxviii/Bxix, fn.)

The result of this experiment is that (i) our a priori knowledge only concerns appearances as objects of possible experiences, but is compatible with the “Sache an sich selbst” being “wirklich, aber für uns unerkannt” (Bxx), and (ii), that the concept of the ‘unconditioned’ (das Unbedingte) is consistent only if found “nicht an Dingen, so fern wir sie kennen (sie uns gegeben werden), wohl aber an ihnen, so fern wir sie nicht kennen, als Sachen an sich selbst” (Bxx). In both the analytical and the dialectical part, we are thus asked to distinguish two aspects of the putative objects of our knowledge claims (the not further specified use of “Gegenstand”, prior to the introduction of the ‘in itself’/‘as it appears’ distinction): as objects of possible experience and as objects of mere thought.

In the analytical part, the knowledge we have is characterised as being of appearances, to which we **reach out** as they are in themselves (if the pun is permitted), i.e. of which we may have full and adequate knowledge, while we may still legitimately regard them as being **anchored** in things in themselves, i.e. as appearances *of* things. In the dialectical part, the knowledge we lack is characterised as being of things in themselves, i.e. things **beyond our reach**, of which we may nevertheless know that they **anchor** the knowledge we have. Rather than being superimposed on an ontological duality, the distinction between ways of conceptualising the objects of our knowledge is *directly* used to draw a boundary from within, while the ontological distinction is then appealed to underwrite the realism of our conception of the objects of knowledge. In this sense, we literally have a reversal of explanation: rather than distinguish knowable from unknowable aspects within each of the two components of the objects of our knowledge, we directly draw this distinction a priori from general principles and subsequently explain their duality in terms of it.

The attempt to ‘draw a boundary from within’ is to be judged by its success in reconciling the two consistent disambiguations of what it means to know what cannot be known: while we cannot consistently claim to know that which cannot be known, we may, and by following Kant’s lead, are supposed to, acquire knowledge both of what distinguishes things we can know about from things of which no such knowledge is possible and of what general features of things are knowable and what other properties can never be knowingly attributed to anything.

The purpose of this paper is to describe a general model for how we could, and in my view should – both in our general pursuit of truth and in order to be as charitable to Kant as we can – understand the contrast and relation between appearances and things in themselves. The model proposed is the relation a thing has to its aspects and the difference between it and its aspects. Our knowledge is of things in themselves in so far as they can be known at all, i.e. as appearing; and things in themselves are things that have (or at least may have) aspects we know, which explains how, even though they are unknowable, there are things we know *of* them.

Understanding appearances as aspects of things in themselves is not, I hope to show, just a vacuous reformulation of Kantian claims, though it has solid motivations in the Kantian texts, both as regards appearances (sct. 1.3) and things in themselves (sct. 1.4). To substantiate this claim, I argue on systematic grounds that it provides us with a plausible way of reconciling **anchoring** and **reaching out** above, by justifying our basing knowledge on appearances (sct. 2.2) while retaining a robust realism about the objects of such knowledge. On the general interpretative template I will defend, Kant’s answers to the questions above are the following: **homonymy** Knowledge is aspectival: Knowing that *a* is *F* is to know, of *a*, that it has an appearance-aspect

that is F , i.e. that a -as-appearing is F .

veil Knowledge is of aspects: Knowing that a is F is to know, of the appearance-aspect of a , that it is F .

This answer to **homonymy** provides us with a way of satisfying **anchoring** because knowing, of a , that it has an F -appearance aspect is knowing something about a , and of a , and our knowledge is thus adequately grounded in the unknowable. The answer to **veil** allows for **reaching out** because it characterises knowledge as a relation between two really existing, knowable and particular things. The reconciliation of the tension diagnosed relies on the peculiarity of the *being an aspect of* relation of ‘transmitting’ knowledge: knowledge of the aspect is automatically aspectival knowledge of the thing that has the aspect. If, in addition, the knowledge of the aspect is of the aspect as the aspect (of the aspect in itself, if this construction is permitted), then we also know that it includes knowledge of the thing that has the aspect – an epistemic state the transcendental inquiry that explicitly draws the distinction and characterises knowledge claims with regard to the ‘Erkenntnisarten’ involved, is supposed to help us achieve.

In the second section I want to show that, in so far as it allows us to give these answers, my interpretation schema is systematically superior to rival, and more committal, interpretations, of the methodological (sct. 2.1), metaphysical two-world (sct. 2.3) and metaphysical dual-aspect varieties (sct. 2.4). The relative advantages it may claim in comparison to these, however, are partly due to its being only schematic: it is its neutrality that allows it to take ontology seriously, while both avoiding phenomenalist auto-affection and solipsism and ‘dual-aspect’/property-dualist commitment to noo-logical predication, i.e. predication of empirical predicates of things in themselves as such.

While I think that sct. 2 shows that some version of the appearances-as-aspect interpretation is preferable to the available alternatives, the template sketched is too schematic to elucidate the problems of transcendental idealism concretely enough to make it evaluable as a metaphysical system. This is why in sct. 3 I sketch one more substantial theory of what aspects are, characterising them as dependent extrinsic (sct. 3.1) and horizontally grounded (sct. 3.2), but nevertheless real and mind-independent things.

1.3 Knowing things in so far as they can be known

That we know things in so far as they can be known at all is for Kant an analytical statement. This is certainly right in one sense of “in so far” and it is quite customary to use aspect-talk to specify necessary conditions: if I say, e.g., that I invited Paul to the party in so far as he is (or: as) the godfather of my daughter, I implicate that I would not have invited him otherwise; if I say that I invited him only as the godfather (or: only invited him as the godfather), I not only implicate but state that his being my daughter’s godfather was a necessary condition for inviting him. In this sense of “in so far” it follows analytically from “ x is known” that the necessary conditions for knowledge of x are fulfilled, insofar these are not further specified than as “whatever is entailed by x ’s being known”. The crucial question is what these conditions are, and the question of analyticity will then depend on how we come to know that these are the necessary conditions for knowledge. Whether analytic or synthetic, however, these conditions will enter only into a specification of the type of aspects that are known, and not be needed to justify that they are aspects at all. The analyticity of the claim that we know aspects, i.e. things in so far as they can be known, is untouched. What is synthetic, though still a priori, is the specification of what aspects these are. It is in this sense that Kant uses “nur so fern” to state as a result of the Analytic that we have Erkenntnis “von keinem Ding an sich selbst, sondern nur so fern es Objekt der sinnlichen Anschauung ist” (Bxxvi).

The specification of necessary conditions by “in so far as” clauses is often implicitly contrastive, either to other aspects or to what is abstracted from them. If I say that I invited him as a the godfather of my daughter, I may be taken to say, or at least implicate, that I would not have invited him *as a judge*, and perhaps even that I would not have invited him *as such*, or simpliciter. Whether or not such a reading that imputes a contrast with the thing as such or simpliciter is available often depends on background information: saying that some sheet of paper is worth 10 € in so far as it has been properly issued by the Bundesbank, is, or at least entails, that the paper *as such* is not worth its monetary value, because we entertain (and partially state in the first sentence) the view that monetary value accrues only to objects playing certain functional social roles and accrues to them in virtue of their fulfilling such roles. The degree of ‘contrastivity’ of such aspect predications correspond to the degree to which the aspectival condition is not just a necessary, but

also a sufficient condition: the proper pedigree entails the monetary worth of the piece of paper.

When aspectival modifications state not just necessary, but also a sufficient condition for the predication in which they occur, this sufficient condition of a special kind – one that specifies the ground, the reason of the aspect’s exemplifying the property predicated. If I say that x is F as G , G often serves to explain why only as G x is F , or to state that G grounds or explains why F is exemplified. It is precisely in these cases that we may well feel queasy about predicating F of x as *such*, or simpliciter, and rather prefer to predicate it of x as G . In these cases, the aspect-of relation is what I will call “cognitively encapsulating”: the justification I have to predicate “ F ” of x qua G (rather than, say, to predicate of x qua H) is *also* a reason *not* to predicate “ F ” of x *simpliciter*. The reason for this is not that it gives us justification to think that “ Fx ” would be false; the reason rather is that because “ G ” specifies *why* a qua G is F and we chose “ G ” rather than another possible adverbial modification for this purpose, the unadorned predication “ Fa ” would, even if possibly true for all we know, be brute and unexplained.

Kant plausibly, I think, assumed that the most general necessary condition for knowledge of a is that a appears, i.e. that it may be ‘given’ ‘in intuition’, which is the “Bedingung der Möglichkeit aller Erfahrung” (A28/B44). To say that we know a as it appears thus is to say that this most general necessary condition for the truth of this statement is fulfilled, i.e. that a *does* appear. I think that “appearance” and “affection” are mostly interchangeably used terms for whatever it is that makes synthetic knowledge possible. It does not, of course, follow from the fact that a as it appears is F , that “ Fa ” is brute and unexplained, and thus possibly false for all we know. To establish for what substitutions for “ F ” this is the case is precisely Kant’s project in the Analytic. What the foregoing considerations show, however, is why this project is undertaken in the form of a search for sufficient conditions. To the extent that we establish not just the necessity but the sufficiency of appearing for a certain class of predications of a , we acquire a reason to withhold predications within this class of the ‘unadorned’ a .

To say that we know a as it appears also means to speak of a in a certain way. In the B Preface, Kant uses “als Erscheinung” and “als Ding an sich selbst” to mark how he takes “das Objekt in zweierlei Bedeutung” (Bxxvii). This does not just mean that he speaks of things in two different ways, but that it is to commit the fallacy of equivocation to infer a conclusion about a as thing in itself from premises only about a as appearance – “ways of representation” (Vorstellungsarten) he characterises as “intellectual” and “sensual” respectively (Bxxviii). Characterising what makes an inquiry transcendental, the B edition replaces “Begriffe[...] a priori von Gegenständen überhaupt” (A12-13) with “Erkenntnisart von Gegenständen, so fern diese [Erkenntnisart] a priori möglich sein soll” (B25). The transcendental perspective is thus characterised as distinguishing things according to the ways in which they can be known and it is from this characterisation that the restriction of the pure concepts of the understanding is said to “flow” (“davon herrührend”, Bxxviii). Kant thus distinguishes two ways of cognising objects, one sensual, the other intellectual, such that the first entails the second (Bxxvi), but not vice versa: to speak of things as they appear is to qualify the claim made about them, and to speak of things in themselves is to drop this qualification. The charge of equivocation against inferring the unqualified claim from a qualified one is the fallacy known to the medievals as “secundum quid ad simpliciter” (cf. *De Soph.*, 167a7-9).

Something that appears, on anyone’s view, is an appearance; appearances, in my view, are also things in so far as they appear, and all things in so far as they appear are appearances. This may strike some as too realist an interpretation of “appearance”, identifying appearances with the objects of knowledge, albeit under a qualification. How is this supposed to be compatible with what Kant says about their being representations, even ‘nothing but’ representations, in our sensibility, merely subjective and existing only relative to us? “Vorstellung” (representation) is Kant’s most general term for whatever it is in virtue of which we reach out to the world. In the very first paragraph of the Aesthetic, he very tightly links it to “Erscheinung”:

Die Wirkung eines Gegenstandes auf die Vorstellungsfähigkeit, sofern wir von demselben affiziert werden, ist Empfindung. Diejenige Anschauung, welche sich auf den Gegenstand durch Empfindung bezieht, heißt empirisch. Der unbestimmte Gegenstand einer empirischen Anschauung heißt Erscheinung. (A19-20/B33)

In the ‘Stufenleiter’ passage, he characterises “Vorstellung” as the genus of the mental and “Empfindung” as a modification of the subject:

Eine Perzeption, die sich lediglich auf das Subjekt, als die Modifikation seines Zustandes bezieht, ist Empfindung (*sensatio*). (KrV, A320/B376)

Rather than feeling a tension between the two roles played by sensation, to be that by which intuition relates to its object and at the same time a mode of the subject, Kant seems to believe that the subjectivity of sensation, i.e. its second role, *explains* how it is suited to play the first – or at least he says so in the letter to Hertz:

...aus welchem Grunde beruhet die Beziehung desienigen, was man in uns Vorstellung nennt, auf den Gegenstand? Enthält die Vorstellung nur die Art, wie das subiect von dem Gegenstande afficirt wird, so ist leicht einzusehen, wie er diesem als eine Wirkung seiner Ursache gemäß sey und wie diese Bestimmung unsres Gemüths etwas vorstellen d.i. einen Gegenstand haben könne. (AA X 130ff.)

I think that a plausible interpretation of these passages is the following: within the domain of the knowable, and whenever there is sensation, representing and appearing are converse relations: to say that x represents y is to say that y appears to x . Moreover, they are also correlative: what y is represented as is what y appears as. This does not mean that representation, being a different relation, ‘inherits’ its content from appearance (this would be incompatible with their being converses) – it rather means that one and the same aspect is both an aspect of the representation and an aspect of the appearance: the representing and the appearing thing share the aspect by which they are given to us. It is in this sense, I propose, that appearances *are* representations.

This may appear much too quick: how can the representing and the appearing thing be one and the same at least in the sense of sharing an aspect if the first is the vehicle and the second the object of knowledge? An initial step towards reconciling the mentality of appearances with their status as objects of empirical knowledge is to mark the multiple ambiguity of expressions such as “appearance” and “representation”. Both “appearance” and “representation” share the process/event ambiguity of, e.g., “swimming”. The swimming that occurs at a certain place, during a certain period, is both something that is done and the doing of it: by swimming, we may say, I bring into existence a certain thing that is the swimming (or: the swim). They also share the action/result ambiguity of many action verbs (though not of swimming). By “the turning on of the light”, we may mean not just the act that turned on the light (an event) and the whole process whereby the light has come to be turned on, but also its result, the onset of illumination in the light. Most pronounced is the act/result ambiguity in terms for mental actions. “Thinking”, for example, may refer to what I should have been doing before entering the car (an action) or to what the person over there has been doing for more than an hour now (a process), but also for the identifiable and countable results of a mental activity (thoughts): “I like your thinking”; “this issue needs some fresh thinking” (as opposed to, e.g. “some more thinking”, which would refer to the process), “my thinking was that p ” – and it may refer to both process and result at the same time, as in “your thinking is confused on this point”.

This multiple ambiguity, I think, is shared not just by “perceive”, “sense”, “conceive” etc., but also by “appear” and “represent”. To speak of “ x as it appears” is thus ambiguous in at least three ways:

process the processes of appearing and of representing are different – they differ in their direction, and in what they are grounded in: things appear in virtue of how they are, while subjects represent in virtue of how they are and these grounds are different in the case of the representation of mind-independent matters of fact;

event the two processes may still coincide, and thus be the same event: every appearing is then also a being represented, and every representing also a being appeared to: it is in virtue of such coincidence that these events make available the same information, and reveal the same aspect of the world;

result the one event that is both adequately described as “ x appears to y as F ” and “ y is represented as F by x ” may still have two different results, and modify its two relata in two different ways: as a dancing ‘produces’ both a dancer and a dance, an event of representing/appearing produces both an appearance and a representation.

This analysis, I hope, makes available a sense in which appearances are *both* aspects of things in themselves and representations, and is compatible with the text of (both editions of) the *Critique*. In some passages

where Kant says that appearances are nothing but representations, the identification serves to stress the contrast with things in themselves: appearances are said to be transcendently ideal in that they are *regarded as* representations *rather than* as things in themselves (A369). This contrast is sometimes underscored by the use of “selbst”, “an sich” (!) and “als solche”, as in

...Erscheinungen selbst [sind] nichts als sinnliche Vorstellungen [...], die an sich, in eben derselben Art, nicht als Gegenstände (ausser der Vorstellungskraft) müssen angesehen werden (A104)
...Erscheinungen können, als solche, nicht ausser uns statt finden, sondern existieren nur in unserer Sinnlichkeit.” (A 127)
...Gesetze existieren ebenso wenig in den Erscheinungen, sondern nur relativ auf das Subjekt, dem die Erscheinungen inhärieren, als Erscheinungen nicht an sich existieren, sondern nur relativ auf dasselbe Wesen, so fern es Sinne hat. [...] Allein Erscheinungen sind nur Vorstellungen von Dingen, die, nach dem, was sie an sich sein mögen, unerkant da sind. (B 164)

In other passages, such as the one cited above (A19-20/B33), Kant claims that appearances are representations in so far as they have an intentional object, an ‘unbestimmter Gegenstand’, which is the notion of the “something else (X)” to which he appealed to in the A introduction to explain how synthetic judgments go beyond the subject concept (A 8) and which he characterised there as the “vollständige Erfahrung von dem Gegenstandes” – a phrase he replaces in the B edition by “Gegenstand der Erfahrung” (B12). I do not think that this is a significant change – in both cases, he means the intentional object of our inquiry into the nature of some thing:

Alle unsere Vorstellungen werden in der Tat durch den Verstand auf irgend ein Objekt bezogen, und, da Erscheinungen nichts als Vorstellungen sind, so bezieht sie der Verstand auf ein Etwas, als den Gegenstand der sinnlichen Anschauung... (A 254)
Erscheinungen [...] enthalten also über die Anschauung noch die Materien zu irgend einem Objekte überhaupt (wodurch etwas Existierendes im Raume oder der Zeit vorgestellt wird), d.i. das Reale der Empfindung, als bloss subjektive Vorstellung, von der man sich nur bewusst werden kann, dass das Subjekt affiziert sei, und die man auf ein Objekt überhaupt bezieht, in sich. (B 207-208)

The point here is that appearances, insofar as they are event-identical with representations, are essentially extrinsic, that they are *of* something else than themselves. Because they are only event-, but not result-identical with representations, this is compatible with appearances and Anschauungen being extrinsic in different ways: while the second are extrinsic because they are relational, i.e. because they ‘give’ a determinate singular object, the former are just ‘generically relational’, in that they are appearances of something or other. That it is undetermined by the appearances itself of what it is an appearance is, I think, the property Kant stresses in his ‘mentalistic’ characterisations of transcendental idealism:

[T]ranszendente[r] Idealismus aller Erscheinungen [ist der] Lehrbegriff, nach welchem wir sie insgesamt als blosse Vorstellungen, und nicht als Dinge an sich selbst, ansehen ... (A369)²
...äussere Gegenstände (die Körper) [sind] bloss Erscheinungen, mithin auch nichts anderes, als eine Art meiner Vorstellungen, deren Gegenstände nur durch diese Vorstellungen etwas sind, von ihnen abgesondert aber nichts [sind]. (A371)³
Aber wir sollten bedenken: dass nicht die Körper Gegenstände an sich sind, die uns gegenwärtig sind, sondern eine blosse Erscheinung, wer weiss, welches unbekanntes Gegenstandes, [...] dass folglich [sie] nicht etwas ausser uns, sondern bloss Vorstellungen in uns sind... (A 387)

It is useful to bear in mind that Kant here states only an aspect (if the word is permitted) of his general view, which combines transcendental idealism with empirical realism. It is the latter part of the doctrine that allows us to take appearances to be *not just* representations, but also appearances of things in themselves.

²Kemp Smith translates: “By transcendental idealism I mean the doctrine that appearances are to be regarded as being, one and all, representations only, not things in themselves ...” This leaves out the qualification of “transcendental idealism” and the “blosse” and also imposes a distributive reading of “insgesamt”, where a collective is possible as well.

³Again, the Kemp Smith translation is tendentious: “External objects (bodies) are mere appearances, and therefore nothing but a species of my representations...”. Kant does not say “mere”, but “only” (“bloss”, not “blosse”), and “Art” is much more general than “species” and might, for example, also mean “way”.

Even if systematically defensible, the identification of appearances and representation makes Kant vulnerable to the charge of equivocation. Even if they are correlative, and are the endpoints (abstracted relational properties) of one and the same relation, representations and appearances differ in many ways, most importantly in that only the latter, but not the former may be realistically regarded as *objects* of our knowledge. How is this tension to be resolved? I do not think a happy-face solution is available. The following considerations may perhaps, however, not just excuse Kant of what seems to be terminological carelessness (an accusation he would take very seriously), but even to some extent justify his use of language.

In many uses, we use words to speak both of what they stand for and of themselves. Perhaps the most famous example are cases of so-called ‘mixed’ quotation, as in “Giorgione was so-called because of his size”, a sentence in which, on any acceptable interpretation, “Giorgione” ‘makes available’ (to use the most non-committal term possible) both the person and the word, “Giorgione”. The phenomenon appears to be more widespread, however: it plausibly occurs in belief reports such as “I was very worried – she said she went to the ophthalmologist, a word she would not normally use” or “she called him a liar, though not explicitly so”. It is particularly common with that-clauses: “She said that he was a notorious liar. The thought had never occurred to me”; “Most people around here are Christian, a belief system that is alien to me”. In such cases, we have two specifications of a single thing, one with regard to its content (that he was a notorious liar, Christianity), the other one with respect to its mode (the thought, the belief system). It may well be that some such shift occurs when Kant moves from talk about appearances (as possible objects of knowledge) to representations (specifying their content, thereby specifying what is predicated of the appearance).

1.4 Knowing things in so far as they cannot be known

Whereas appearances are things as they appear, some of the things so appearing are things in themselves. Not all appearing things are things in themselves: appearances also appear. So a distinction is needed, marked by Kant by the use of ‘in itself’. A thing in itself is a thing that appears, but does not appear simpliciter, but only ‘through’ an appearance. This may be taken to give rise to a difficulty: by what criterion is Kant to distinguish between ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ appearing, the first denied, the latter asserted of things in themselves? I do not think, however, that Kant would regard this question as legitimate: if we characterise appearances as things in so far as they satisfy the necessary conditions for us to have knowledge of them (whatever they are), it just *follows* that we cannot know things except as appearances: whenever we know anything of *a*, these necessary conditions are satisfied and there is thus an appearance of *a*, which is all ‘of *a*’ we may be said to know.

That we cannot know things in themselves on the basis of how they appear to us does not, however, entail that we do not know them at all. We do know about them, as Bxxvi makes clear, how they appear to us. As Prauss (1977: 16) has noted, Kant says at B70 that it is the things in themselves that appear to us and that how they appear to us (“die Prädikate der Erscheinungen”) can be attributed to the “Objekte selbst [...] in Verhältnis auf unseren Sinn”. They can, however, be attributed to the things in themselves only with this qualification, for the predicate does not mean anything in abstraction from the “subjective condition, under which alone we can have [...] intuition” (A42/B59).⁴

This is but one kind of knowledge we can have of things in themselves. Another important source of knowledge is a priori reasoning: while we cannot cognize them as such, we still must be able to think things in themselves, for they are conceptually linked to their aspects. It is this conceptual link, I think, that underlies the otherwise quite careless seeming transition, in announcing the results of the Analytic in the B Preface, from the restriction of Erkenntnis to *mere* objects of experience (i.e. appearances) to the thinkability of these very things (“eben dieselben Gegenstände”, Bxxvi) as things in themselves: “Denn sonst würde der ungereimte Satz daraus folgen, dass Erscheinung ohne etwas wäre, was da erscheint.” (B xxvi-xxvii)

In this sense, things in themselves are very different from ‘bare particulars’. Even if we cannot know *a* in itself, we may be perfectly able to truly and justifiably attribute properties to *a*. For example, we may know that we do not know *a*, but we may also know a lot of other things about it, of both the empirical and the transcendental kind. When Holmes is looking for the murderer, he may perfectly know that he did this or

⁴Very similarly, he says in the Amphiboly that space and time are “sinnliche Anschauungen, in denen wir alle Gegenstände lediglich als Erscheinungen bestimmen”.

that, that he must be in the garden shed or that he is not in the room. ‘The murderer’, it will be replied, is not something we could know (either because it’s not an object, or not definite enough, or for some other reason). Let us then focus on some particular non-existent person (this is possible because not all possible persons exist and because every person has, let us suppose, a certain time and place of birth; let us then pick the merely possible person which will be born closest to us now in time and space, supposing that births, even of twins, cannot exactly spatio-temporally overlap) and call it ‘Johan’. It is very plausible to assume that I do not know Johan (and not just that I do not know who Johan is, or what it is, or that he is *F*, for some *F*s). We do know, however, a lot of things *of* Johan: that it is not here, that it is not yet born, that it is a person etc. We also know synthetic truths about Johan: that Johan is not a tiger, say (because no person is a tiger) and that Johan is taller than 3cm (because no person is 3cm or less tall). Some of these we also know a priori: that Johan is a thinking being and that the I-think must be able to accompany all of his thoughts.

It would be a mistake to think that the only reason we know all these things about Johan is that we introduced his name (or rather: a name for him) ‘by description’. Our introducing a name for him is, of course, a necessary condition for us to claim *de re* knowledge; but it is not plausibly the ground of all that knowledge. No analysis of “person” will inform us about the sizes persons may have, and about their not being tigers, and even much less about them being thinkers of I-thoughts or moral subjects. That things in themselves are not qualified as fulfilling the necessary conditions for us to have knowledge of them *as such* thus does not entail that they are unknowable. Quite to the contrary: speaking of them as they are in themselves rather undermines a positive predication of knowability. It is certainly true, of *a*, that we cannot say that we know it if we do not take the necessary conditions for us having knowledge of *a* to be fulfilled, this should not, by itself, be taken as a predication, of *a*, of unknowability: *a* may very well be known, after all, as appearance. The question of the knowability of *a* rather is the question whether *a* has an appearance (aspect) by or through which we know it – and for many things we talk about, according to Kant, this is not the case.

It is thus perfectly possible to know a lot of things about objects considered as merely possible – which is, after all, how we consider things when we consider them in abstraction from their being given, as objects of merely possible *empirical* knowledge. The knowledge we have of things in themselves is not just categorically different from the knowledge we lack (concerning noumena only in the ‘negative’ and not the ‘positive’ sense) but it is also a distinction between different ways of knowing grounded on a difference between the cognitive faculties (Erkenntnisarten) involved:

Gleichwohl wird, welches wohl gemerkt werden muß, doch dabei immer vorbehalten, daß wir eben dieselben Gegenstände auch als Dinge an sich selbst, wenn gleich nicht erkennen, doch wenigstens müssen denken können. (Bxxvi)

Der Verstand also, eben dadurch daß er Erscheinungen annimmt, gesteht auch das Dasein von Dingen an sich selbst zu, und so fern können wir sagen, daß die Vorstellung solcher Wesen, die den Erscheinungen zum Grunde liegen, mithin bloßer Verstandeswesen nicht allein zulässig, sondern auch unvermeidlich sei. (Prol. A105, §32)

The epistemic modality, itself grounded, according to Kant, in the general cognitive set-up of humans and other beings with a discursive intellect, highlights the second ingredient of Kant’s ‘dual-aspect’ account of appearances: while the aspect-of relation is cognitively encapsulating, it is also objectively real, and knowably so. Because we can know, through transcendental inquiry, that our empirical knowledge is of appearances, i.e. of things appearing in certain ways, we *thereby* know that there is something that appears to us, and of which we know that it appears to us in certain ways.

This conceptual link, as Kant emphasises in the refutation of idealism, is not causal. But nor is it ‘grounding’, at least in the sense in which it is ordinarily understood as a contemporary term of art. There cannot be, for Kant, any empirically real, nor in other ways explanatory and thus intelligible relation between the thing in itself and ‘its’ appearance. If there were such a relation, representations (what appearances also are) would be grounded in their intentional objects, which is incompatible with their being true or false, or indeed representations at all. The dependence is rather in the other direction: it is the representation of the object, the *Anschauung*, that depends on it. It is the appearance that has to be an appearance of something, simply in virtue of being an appearance.

Identifying things in themselves with the intentional objects of appearances, considered as representations,

comes at an exegetical price, however. They cannot be the “unbestimmter Gegenstand”, at least if this is to be understood in an absolute sense: instead they must be the “dadurch unbestimmter Gegenstand”, i.e. objects that are not determined by their appearances having certain properties. What, if any, determinations the things in themselves have, is unknown and unknowable; all we can say is that it is not the case that they have certain features just in virtue of their appearances having them.

2 Appearances as aspects

2.1 The need for a third way

In many, and important, places Kant uses the ‘as appearance’/‘in itself’ contrast to characterise two different ways of looking at, speaking of or characterising things. When used as adverbial modifications of phrases such as “*x* conceives of *y*”, “*x* regards *y*” or “*x* takes *y*”, the distinction is primarily used to qualify knowledge claims about *y*, to disambiguate such claims in order to avoid the ‘secundum quid ad simpliciter’ fallacy. In such locutions, the ‘as appearance’/‘in itself’ modifiers are of the noun phrase substituting *y*. They qualify, at least grammatically, not the *contents* of the conceiving, regarding, taking or considering, but their objects. But in what way do they qualify them? It is tempting, though by no means obligatory, to construe the effect of the modification as a shifting of the subject matter: when modified by the as-clause, the predication is no longer of *y*, but of something else, *y*-as-such and such.

Cajus might be good *qua* cobbler without being good (*On Int.*, 20 b35–7, *De Soph.* 177 b15). In the absence of sound theoretical justification, we should understand this both as a predication of goodness and as a predication of Cajus, though it is emphatically *not* a predication of goodness of Cajus. Even if, however, theoretical motivation is available to construe the as-clause either as a NP-modifier (Landman 1989) or as VP-modifier (Szabó 2003), we have to keep a sense in which (and explain how) the thus modified Cajus-qua-cobbler or *being good for a cobbler* stand to Cajus and *being good* respectively. Thus even if the predication is not (directly) of Cajus or not (directly) of goodness, there is a more complicated way in which it does, on either account, relate Cajus to goodness.

It is in this sense that, when we regard *x* as *y*, we take *x* to be some way, and our regarding *x* in this way will be true if, but also only if, *x* really is that way. And it is crucial to Kant’s project that we may take his ‘Copernican’ way of regarding the objects of knowledge not just as an instrumentally useful fiction or a theoretically useful heuristic, but as exhibiting, and being responsible to the true nature of things. To take claims that are a priori and synthetically true if true at all to be *explained* by interpreting them as concerning things regarded in some way *is* to claim that things may legitimately regarded this way and that, so interpreted, such claims are true of them. We cannot, therefore, simply shirk the ontological question.⁵

That things may legitimately be considered as they appear to us thus means not just that they do so appear to us, but also that the way they appear stands in some specifiable relation to the way they are. This relation does not have to be identity: it may be legitimate to regard my guitar as fragile (by e.g. writing “fragile” on the moving box that contains it), even though it is not fragile in the way I usually use this word; it may equally be legitimate to regard my toddler as a rational being in certain contexts even though, all things considered, she really is not. In all these cases, however, there is *something* about the objects I regard as being a certain way they are not that justifies my regarding them so.

We cannot stay content with a bare existential claim, however. To make progress on our theoretical desiderata, what it is about the things that justifies us in so regarding them must fulfill a certain complex theoretical role. In particular, to avoid **homonymy**, the charge that the sense in which we know things regarded as appearances is *not* the sense in which we want to know things about how the world is like, what justifies us regarding things as appearances must be what makes them knowable, to the extent that they are knowable at all, in the ordinary sense. In this sense, the property has to be ‘subjective’, in the sense that “I know of *y* as appearance that it is *F*”, while it attributes to me perhaps a certain action (“By regarding *y* as appearance, ...”), it also predicates of me the relation of knowledge, and not just the relation expressed by “*x* knows of *y*”

⁵The “cannot” here, of course, needs qualification. I mean that that the (pure) methodological interpretation makes Kant’s project *pointless* and is thus not as charitable as we should try to be. I also mean that it thereby makes it *uninteresting*, thereby undermining the justification we have to be interested in Kant at all.

as appearance that it is F ".⁶ At the same time, to make progress on **veil**, it has to be a property that does not 'distort' reality, that is 'transparent' in the sense that the property that justifies my taking a predication of F of a thing regarded as appearance to be a predication of that thing. If it is properly said that we know things *through* what is responsible for their appearing to us, then this property has to be one that the objects of our knowledge really have, and not just one they *appear* to have. In this sense it has to be objective: "I know of y as appearance that it is F " has to be a predication of the property of *appearing* of y , not just of the property of *appearing-to-be- F* .⁷

It is difficult to meet both these desiderata: they seem to require, e.g., that we parse " x appears to me square" *both* as " x -as-it-appears-to-me is square", which satisfies **homonymy**, but gives rise to **veil**, and as " x appears-to-me-square", which does not incur **veil**, but falls prey to **homonymy**. Is a third way possible? In order to answer this question, I examine in the next section how the charge that Kant, or Kantians, commit a certain fallacy, i.e. the fallacy of inferring the first from the second, may be answered.

2.2 The 'Kantian fallacy' (this we discussed in December already – feel free to skip)

In the epistemic community where I grew up philosophically, Kant was not particularly highly regarded. Aside from being blamed, often unconsciously, for Hegel and 'continental philosophy', his gravest sin was taken to have inferred metaphysical conclusions from epistemological premisses. One way of making this reproach more precise was to attribute to him the following reasoning from **P** to **C**, informally known as 'the Kantian fallacy':

P We only know things if they affect us.

C We only know things as they affect us.

The inference is from a necessary condition of (our possessing, or entertaining) a representation to the content of that representation. By the factivity of knowledge, the metaphysical conclusion follows: things as they affect us are all the things we can know, and, insofar as we know, are all the things there are. The inference is, of course, invalid, and obviously so: there are many necessary conditions for our knowing anything that do not constrain *what* we can know – why should 'affection' be any different?⁸ On this question, of course, Kant has a lot of things to say – but that is irrelevant, his accusers say, because no number of additional premisses could licence a metaphysical conclusion unless they were themselves metaphysical, and thus begging the question. The whole Kantian project, thus understood, is taken to be doomed from the outset.

Contrary to appearances, however, there is no need to worry: there is a way, or so I will claim, of making (something like) an inference from **P** to **C** not only valid, but also plausibly sound. However, doing so will require paying a bit of attention both to the 'things' mentioned in the premiss and the notorious little word "as" in the conclusion. On my interpretation, **P** is strengthened to require things to have *aspects*, and the having of these aspects to be the object of (at least some) empirical knowledge and **C** is then read as restricting our knowledge (of these things) to those aspects. The things that affect us are things that have

⁶In the realm of perception, pure relationalist theories face this problem in the following way: if we construe knowledge as a direct relation, on the model of hitting, then we have to explain what it is about its supposed relata (facts, propositions) that explains why in knowing x , but not in hitting x , I may be said to take a perspective on the world, as construing it a certain way which is either correct (true) or incorrect (false). Simply to say that it is the nature of these objects is not just not explanatory, makes it quite mysterious why we should stand in the knowledge relation to only such things, but also threatens to make it quite impossible to draw the appearance/reality distinction in the right way: my being related to the proposition that penguins are birds is as much an objective fact as my being related to the proposition that penguins are fish. The difference in the objects (that one is true and the other not) invoked to explain why the perspective I take on the world in virtue of being so related is in the one case accurate and inaccurate in the other case, can *also* explain the difference in me, i.e. that I know in the one, but merely believe in the other case, only if true belief is knowledge – which it is not.

⁷This is a problem for sense-data theories of perception: we need to distinguish, among the sense-data we (are said to) have, between their properties that are (blueness, redness) and that are not (bluriness, being mental) attributable to the objects they 'come from'. This means that sense-data themselves need a dual character, being 'windows' on the one hand, and themselves not quite spotless on the other. This comes dangerously close to making an appearance/reality distinction for sense-data themselves, at which point their introduction becomes pointless.

⁸It may perhaps be thought, with some basis in the Kantian texts, that the inference goes through if the 'only if' in **P** not only states a necessary condition for x , but a necessary condition for the very possibility of x . But even if our knowledge of things is only possible because of y , or only possible through z , or on the basis of w , it does not follow that either y , z or w has anything to do with the things our knowledge is about or the contents we know about these things.

aspects, and it is their aspects we know (and only by their aspects that we know them). My interpretation is thus ‘two-world’, claiming that the things affecting us (the notorious ‘things-in-themselves’, or ‘noumena’, as I will call them in the following)⁹ and the things we (are said to) have knowledge of (the ‘appearances’, or ‘phaenomena’) are numerically distinct. By maintaining a very close link between them, however, my reading inherits, or so I hope, the main advantages of the ‘one-world’ but ‘two-aspects’ interpretations, which usually construe Kant as drawing a distinction between knowable (‘phaenomenal’) and unknowable (‘noumenal’) properties of the very same thing – and which I will for this reason call “property-dualist” interpretations.

That Kant seems to reason from **P** to **C** and that such reasoning is problematic has long been recognised in the literature.¹⁰ In general terms, our problem is to reconcile the realism both about knowledge and about its objects that we take to be compatible with **P** – *because* (at least some) knowledge is of things independent of us, it requires some kind of contact, and without any contact there cannot be knowledge – with the transcendental idealism supposedly expressed by **C**, if **C** is taken to restrict the realm of things we can know about in some meaningful and interesting way.¹¹ I will criticise the dominant two-worlds interpretation, phenomenalism, for giving up too much of **P** and claim that on the dominant, property-dualist version of the one-world interpretation **C** only follows with additional, implausible and un-Kantian premisses. Before doing so, however, let us have another look at the inference.

The restriction of our knowledge expressed in **C**, Kant says time and again, is to things-as-they-affect-us, to appearances.¹² Perhaps appearances are such that the restriction of our knowledge to them can be seen to follow from ‘receptivity’ (or whatever other gloss we would like to put on **P**)? In fact, their introduction does not seem to make the inference any more plausible:

P We only know things if they affect us.

C2 We only know things-as-they-affect-us.

In some respects, **C2** is worse than **C**. We still have a simple fallacy: why should our being affected condition not just our having knowledge (**P**), but also not only its content **C**, but even its objects **C2**? In addition, we have an equivocation: why should premiss **P** talking about some entities justify the step to conclusion **C2**, talking of different entities altogether? The second, though not the first, problem disappears if we reinterpret “things” in **P** in the same way as in **C2**. The inference we get:

P2 We only know things-as-they-affect-us if they affect us.

C2 We only know things-as-they-affect-us.

is not valid either and, in addition, is decidedly antirealist: **P**, after all, was supposed to deal with empirical knowledge of the world out there, not inner acquaintance with private sense data: If we add, to make the step from **P2** to **C2** valid, the further premiss that, necessarily, we are affected by these things we exclusively have knowledge of, the inference, while obviously question-begging, is at least revealing of a respectable philosophical position; but it’s phenomenalism, and we have independent grounds – as I will argue below in sct. 2 – both to think that phenomenalism is wrong and that it is not Kant’s view.

Another possibility is not to tinker with the empirical realism (supposedly) expressed in **P**, but rather with the transcendental idealism (supposedly) expressed by **C**: on a *de re* construal of the conclusion, we may at least hope to preserve the realist intuition that the things affecting us and the things we have knowledge

⁹I do not make a distinction between “thing in itself” and “noumenon”, or between “appearance” and “phaenomenon”, preferring the latter for brevity and because their adjectival forms are less prone to give rise to misunderstandings.

¹⁰Strawson (1966: 250) calls the following “a fundamental and unargued complex premise of the *Critique*”: “Knowledge through perception of things existing independently of perception, as they are in themselves, is impossible. For the only perceptions which could yield us any knowledge at all of such things must be the outcome of our being affected by those things; and for this reason such knowledge can be knowledge only of those things as they appear – of the appearances of those things – and not of those things as they really are or are in themselves.”

¹¹I use “(empirical) realism” and “transcendental idealism” in a broader sense than their use in the Analytic licences, to denote, roughly, what in Kant’s view distinguishes him from Berkeley and from Leibniz respectively.

¹²In fact, the Kantian fallacy is often put as the charge that Kant illicitly *reifies* such appearances, most forcefully so, perhaps, in Prichard (1909: 73–74): “In stating the fact of perception [Kant] substitutes for the assertion that things appear so and so to us the assertion that things produce appearances in us. In this way, instead of an assertion which relates to the thing and states what it is not but only appears, he obtains an assertion which introduces a second reality distinct from the thing, viz. an appearance or phenomenon, and thereby he gains something other than the thing to which space can be attached as a real predicate.” Cf. also: “The former [position] allows that reality is presented to us in perception, but insists that its nature becomes distorted in the process. The latter denies that reality is presented to us at all and substitutes for it another object, viz. ‘appearances’. Further these positions are not always distinguished. Kant, for instance, states his view sometimes in the form ‘we only know things as they appear to us’, sometimes in the form ‘we only know phenomena’, and he fails to notice that the two statements are different.” (Prichard 1906: 223)

about are one and the same. One possibility is the very modest:

P We only know things if they affect us.

C3 We only know of things that they affect us.

Though **C3** preserves some realism in its *de re* construal of the objects of knowledge, the upshot is a very meagre one: the only knowledge we are said to have is that we are affected by some we-know-not, certainly not a basis on which we can hope to explain the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge of mind-independent reality.

What we would want to have instead of **C3**, I presume, is something along the lines of:

P We only know things if they affect us.

C4 We only know of things how they affect us.

The problem with the inference from **P** to **C4** is that the (apparently, as we will see below) only way of making it valid is to redefine the object of the states of knowledge attributed to us in **P** in a way to match up with the “how” in **C4**. So we get:

P4 We only know of things that they have the properties that affect us.

C4 We only know of things how they affect us.

To interpret the Kantian ‘fallacy’ along the lines of **P4** / **C4** is what so-called ‘dual-aspect’, property-dualist interpretations have in common. Though a detailed critique will have to wait for later (sect. 2.4) and depend on what more is said about the properties that affect us, we may, already at this stage, note some general interpretational drawbacks of the property-dualist strategy:

object of knowledge Even if it is (were) unproblematic to speak of knowledge of properties only,¹³ **P4** redefines the *objects of knowledge*: they are not things (as in **P**), but *that* some property is had by some thing. What we know (or are, at least, in principle capable of knowing) of *a*, according to **P4**, is that it has all and only those of its properties that affect us (I will call these its “phenomenal” properties), while its other (in the following called “noumenal”) properties are unknown. **P4** thus says, on this interpretation, that we know, of *a*, that it has (some of) its phenomenal properties, while it is not the case, for any noumenal property *F*, that we know that *a* has *F*. This implies, however, that we do know (or, at least, are in principle capable of knowing) *a* after all (or, at least, know of *a* that it has some properties), though we also know that our knowledge is not complete (i.e. we know we do not know all its properties) – at least if we know **P4** and that *a* must have noumenal properties if it has phenomenal ones (a crucial premiss to which we shall return). Interpreting, in the way of **P4**, “we cannot know *a* as it is in itself but only as it appears to us” as “of the properties of *a*, we cannot know those that are of kind *K*₁, but only those that are of kind *K*₂” makes it entail *that we can know a*. Property-dualist interpretations thus cannot take literally Kant’s ubiquitous talk of the object (Gegenstand) of knowledge.¹⁴

Jacobi This is an aspect of a more general problem, the vulnerability of **P4** to what I will call the “*Jacobi objection*” If we have knowledge of *a* (namely that it has a certain range of [phenomenal] properties), what stops of from asking whether *a* itself is an appearance or a thing-in-itself? Neither answer is plausible: if *a* itself is an appearance, then why think that our knowledge of it is restricted to phenomenal properties? Appearances are, after all, within our epistemic reach. If *a* is a thing-in-itself, on the other hand, we can have knowledge of things-in-themselves after all – but how can we sensibly and even truly ascribe to them the having of properties, if we cannot apply the categories to them?

noumenality Even if **P4** is compatible with the unknowability of noumena, it arguably yields unknowability of the wrong kind: if what is unknowable are only *further* properties, then what distinguishes ‘transcendental’ (and a priori established) unknowability of noumena from our more humdrum ignorance of many of the properties things have? This *symmetry problem* is that **P4** implies that according to Kant on the property-dualist interpretation, the knowledge we lack is basically knowledge of the

¹³I will grant this in the following, even if it is not clear to me how (re-)defining all our knowledge as knowledge of properties avoids the following dilemma: if properties are construed as universals, then it is not clear how we can account for the particularity of much of all our knowledge; if they are property instances, on the other hand, non-shareable and individuated spatio-temporally, the problem is with the generality of what we know and the fact that knowledge should put you in a position to predict and reason counterfactually.

¹⁴In many places, Kant says that there are *things* we cannot know, and cannot know anything of, and this claim is not captured by **P4**.

same kind as the knowledge we already have: if we had cognitive access to things in themselves, we could attribute more and different properties to them, but – special cases of pure noumena (the soul, God) apart – we would not have access to more *things*. A related problem is the *non-iterability* of the as-appearing/in-itself distinction on the property-dualist interpretation. **P₄** is a first-order diagnosis of what we can know and what we cannot. There is no way of making the same distinction with respect to what we can know (the appearances): if we would like to say that some appearances have both a ‘in-themselves’ side and a ‘as they appear’ side, this distinction cannot be made in terms of (higher-order) phenomenal properties of phenomenal properties.

phenomenality The two most serious problems (or sides of one problem), however, concern *co-extension and non-triviality* first and *intensional adequacy*. They turn around the question of why we should take **P₄** to be true at all. Why do we know (or are in principle capable of knowing) all and only phenomenal properties? The most straightforward ways of answering this question are ruled out by the ‘non-triviality’ constraint: **P₄** should be a *synthetic* truth; it should not be true in virtue of the meaning of “phenomenal” alone. Non-trivial coextensionality, however, is still not enough – we also need intensional adequacy: To put forward **P₄** as an explication of **C** is to commit oneself to the claim that, for some thing *a* and a phenomenal property *F* had by *a*, knowing that *a* is *F* is knowing *a* as it appears to us. Why think this is true? **P₄**, after all, is not the simple, and perhaps rather uncontroversial claim that our faculty of cognition is in at least some respects passive: it is the much more ambitious claim that our knowledge is restricted to a certain kind of properties. The plausibility of this claim will of course depend on what this kind of properties is taken to be. The problem here is that the larger the class of knowable properties is taken to be while interpreting **P₄** (problem (i) below), the more difficult it is to justify the inference by making it plausible that these properties are all knowable (problem (ii)) and that knowing them is knowing how we are affected (problem (iii)). This is the task of section 2.4.

Before closing this section, let us take another look at the inference from **P** to **C**. What is required for its validity? Two requirements stand out: (i) we face the *ontological* task of construing the object of knowledge in **C** in a way compatible with it’s also being the subject matter of **P** (to avoid equivocation); (ii) we also have to deal with the *metaphysical* problem of explaining why the condition in **P** can be dropped on the way to the non-conditional statement **C**. Ideally, we solve both problems together, by restricting the quantifiers to things that we know as they affect us not just when they affect us but always.¹⁵ Such things are aspects.¹⁶ Aspects, I think, are needed to capture what was right about the **P₂/C₂** (phenomenalist) interpretations: to make it imply **C**, the quantifier in **P** has to be restricted: it is not generally true that conditioned knowledge is knowledge with conditioned content, though it may be true in some special cases. They are also needed to capture what is right about the **P₄/C₄** interpretation: knowing things as they appear is to know of properties that they are had: it is to know *how* we are affected by things.

My own positive proposal is thus a kind of hybrid between the **P₂/C₂** and **P₄/C₄** versions, also restricting the quantifier in **P**, but not to properties as in **P₄**, but to property-defined things, i.e. aspects:

P₅ We only know of things that they have the aspects to affect us.

C₅ We only know of things-as-they-affect-us.

Is this inference valid? I think it is, if **C₅** is supplemented by an account of how things relate to things-as-they-affect-us. To do so while preserving a sense in which **C₅** is an expression of transcendental idealism is the task of a theory of aspects outlined in sct. 3.1 Is the inference sound? This will depend on what account is given of what **P₅** means by “knowing of something that it has an aspect”, a task I take up in sct. 3.2.

¹⁵This is a much weaker restriction than the one entertained on behalf of the phenomenalist above. The additional premiss the phenomenalists may invoke is that we are always, necessarily, affected by the knowable things while the ‘aspectualist’ only needs that we are always, necessarily by the things we know *as they affect us*.

¹⁶This reading is rather close to Prichard’s. The second quote given above in fn. 12 continues with the claim that we are “forced” to such reification of “appearances” “to gain some object of which it can be said that we know in the proper sense not only *that* it is but *what* it is.” (Prichard 1906: 223)

2.3 Things and their appearances

Before giving such an ‘aspectual’ reading of Kant, we first have to get clearer on the explanandum. A first worry concerns “appearance” – if appearances are the results of the affection we need for knowledge, how can they be its objects? and if they are the (direct, proper) objects of knowledge, how can they be appearances of anything else than themselves? could there really be *things* that combine these two features?

Even if appearance-statements are not about appearances,¹⁷ appearances may still be appealed to in their analysis.¹⁸ We must make room, however, for the possibility that the properties had by these appearances are *not* the properties that appear to us.¹⁹ To play their functional rôle, however, appearances must have properties that are somehow connected to the properties that appear to us: it is, after all, ‘through’ the appearance that we are appeared to.

On the way to such an interpretation, let us first examine, and contrast, three very different types of things that may be said to “appear”:

A two pains, one in my left leg, one in my right leg

B two water droplets, here and there

D two cups, one round and white, the other square and red

Let us start with **D**, perhaps the most familiar case. Talk of “appearance” is here linked to our epistemic access to the cups, and most appropriate if that access is through perception: in seeing the cups, the one appears round and white (but perhaps is not), the other square and red (but perhaps is not). Even though the properties the cups appear to have need not be exemplified in reality, the appearance properties do. We may thus ask: what is required of reality for the cup to have the property *appearing round and white*? The standard response, I presume, is that there has to be a relation, schematically expressed by “*x* appears *ADf* to *y*”, where the “*y*” slot is filled by a thing perceiving (or seeming to perceive) *x* and “*ADf*” is replaced by an adjective that *y* would be internally justified in attributing to *x* on the basis of the experience *y* undergoes when, and because, *x* appears to *y* in this way.

Even excluding the hallucinatory case (where we would presumably rather use “it appears to me that ...”), it may be questioned whether we really always deal with a relation here: is the existence of a perceiving thing really required for the cup to appear round? The best reason to think so, in my opinion, is that a perceiving, or more generally representing thing is needed to explain the distinction between *mere* and *veridical* appearances: whenever a cup appears round, it either is or is not really round. In the second case, the argument goes, the roundness is not ‘out there’, but can only be ‘located’ ‘inside’ a representation. This argument presupposes, however, that roundness has to be ‘located’ in this second case, and we may well deny that it must, preferring a reading of “appears round” that contains “round” as a non-detachable part.²⁰

Even if appearance properties are not relational, however, they are certainly extrinsic.²¹ If there are things that have them essentially, then they too will depend for their existence on other things outside of them; they will not exist by themselves, but in virtue of other things. Among these things, there are some to whom the cups appear in certain ways, and in this sense the appearances themselves are ‘mind-dependent’. This is not, however and importantly, the way Kantian appearances are ‘mind-dependent’. Kantian appearances, if mind-dependent at all (we will return to this point), depend on ‘the’ mind of things that have a discursive intellect and depend on receptive sensibility to have thoughts about objects. Appearance-properties as those appealed to in the analysis of case **D**, on the other hand, depend on minds that take things to be round or white. Another important dimension of difference concerns detachability. For Kant, the inference from

¹⁷This was the point Prichard insisted on: “When I assert that the moon looks as large as the sun, I make an assertion about the moon and not about its look.” (1906: 225)

¹⁸This is granted by Prichard as well: “...the assertion that the moon looks as large as the sun implies that there is something in perception which suggests that the moon is as large...” (1906: 226)

¹⁹Prichard even asserts that *no* appearing property is a property of appearances: “There is no such thing as an attribute of a thing as presented to us. All attributes used in stating how things look are primarily applicable to things as they are.” (1906: 227) If he thinks that the second sentence states a reason to believe in the first, Prichard is mistaken: if there are appearances, they may well have properties, and may well look to us in certain ways.

²⁰The non-detachability of ‘the property the thing appears to have’ is a good reason not to construe appearance statements propositionally, as “it appears to *x* that *y* is *F*”. It is only on such a construal that the notorious ‘phenomenal principle’ is plausible: “If there sensibly appears to a subject to be something which possesses a particular sensible quality then there is something of which the subject is aware which does possess that sensible quality.” (Robinson 1994: 32)

²¹This presupposes, of course, that extrinsicness does not entail relationality, a thesis I argue for in “Relational intrinsics”.

(something like) **P6** to (something like) **C6**

P6 *a* appears round

C6 *a*-as-an-appearance is round

seems analytic – for the appearances in case **D**, it would require something like the (very controversial) ‘phenomenal principle’, often invoked to provide justification for belief in sense-data.

Things stand subtly different with **B**, it seems to me. An assertion such as “When our cellar was flooded, water appeared here and there”, pointing to different places in the basement, does not require for its truth anyone that saw, or otherwise represented water, or water located in some ways. The locational properties, With respect to **A**, we may imagine someone saying “first the pain appeared in my left leg, then in my right”. This does not mean that it was the same pain, nor that it really was there located. All that is needed is that, through proprioception of the pain, some spatial location is “given”.²² The location is thus a feature of the experience, not necessarily of what it is an experience of. Because pains and their experiences are tightly related, pains being essentially felt, it is easy to overlook this difference.

It is not clear, however, that property-dualist interpretations fare any better in this respect. “Appearance” in Kant exhibits a vehicle/content ambiguity and may mean both that which appears a certain way and that by which it appears. It also, more confusingly, appears to mean *the way* (whatever it is) in which objects are given, a sense in which an “appearance” is a “being of sense” (Sinneswesen).²³

It is not clear to me that interpreting talk of appearances in terms of phenomenal properties captures any of these senses neatly. It does not capture the content sense because the content of a representation is never just a property by itself (or rather, never just a concept standing for a property), but also includes an object (or a concept thereof), and the claim that the object has the property. It does not capture the vehicle sense because phenomenal properties are not that by which things appear to us – not even response-dependent properties. Response-dependent properties such as *being red* or *being funny*, even if grounded in our responses to them and defined in terms of them, may appear in quite different ways, or they may even not appear at all (for instance, by being masked, finkish or fragile in the way dispositions are). Thirdly, it does not capture the sense of “appearance” in which it stands for the way objects are given (whatever precise sense can be given to this latter phrase). While it is analytic for Kant that things are given as appearances, it is neither analytic nor true that they are given as having only phenomenal properties; that our senses are such that they can only register and yield knowledge of these properties, is precisely the question of how we justify the step from **P4** to **C4**. This is the problem to which we now turn.

A first aspect of it is a variant of the ‘object of knowledge’ problem mentioned above. Let us grant that both *x* and the way it has its noumenal properties are beyond our grasp – how are we, however, to understand (or even know) that *x* has its phenomenal properties? For all we know, these properties are exemplified by something different altogether (a noumenal property say, or even a phenomenal one). We may, so to say, have warrant for the ‘property part’ of **C4**, and still lack warrant for both the ‘object’ and the ‘exemplification’ part. Let us leave this aside, however, and ask whether we have warrant for the ‘property part’.

2.4 Extant dual-aspect interpretations (this we discussed in December already – feel free to skip)

Dual-aspect interpretations, in my use of the term, are characterised by an endorsement of the inference from **P4** to **C4** above, and by the fact that they underwrite it by a distinction between two types of properties

²²This claim does not require that the pain is experienced as being in the left foot, e.g., but only that the pain and the locational property of being in the left foot are connected in a way that experience of the first entails experience of the second. This is true even on the (nowadays very minoritarian) view that bodily sensations cannot ‘properly’ be said to be located at all: “Position not being a quality, and sensations not being in parts of the body as pins, wounds, and broken bones are in parts of the body, it would seem that the only way in which a part of the body can enter into one’s experience of a pain is as the apparent place of the prick, scratch, cut, or whatever it may be, which has given rise to the sensation. So to have a pain ‘in one’s foot’ is to have a pain which one associates with something being the matter with one’s foot. Strictly speaking, the sensation itself is not located; to talk of having a pain ‘in one’s foot’ is to talk elliptically. One is not really aware of the pain as being in a certain place; one is aware of the pain, and one connects it with a certain place, rather as one connects different sorts of sensations with different sorts of malady-rheumatism, indigestion, and so on.” (Vesey 1961: 26)

²³Cf.: “if we call certain objects, as appearances, beings of sense (phaenomena), because we distinguish the way we intuit them from their constitution in itself, then it already follows from our concept that to these we oppose ...noumena’ (B306).

– which I call the ‘phenomenal’ and the ‘noumenal’ properties –, claiming (i) that phenomenal properties are the only properties that affect, or could affect us, (ii) that they are knowable, at least in principle, and (iii) that knowing that something has a phenomenal property is knowing (at best) how it affects us. Different distinctions between phenomenal and noumenal properties have been put forward:

extrinsicalist (Langton?) All and only phenomenal properties are extrinsic, i.e. are such that their being exemplified or not depends on something outside, and modally independent, of the thing exemplifying (or not exemplifying) them.²⁴

relationalist All and only phenomenal properties are relational, i.e. are dependent for their existence and their nature on metaphysically prior relations, from which they are ‘obtained’ / ‘constructed’ or in which they are ‘grounded’ by way of ‘operations’ such as place-filling (from *being the brother of* to *being the brother of Michael*), reflexivization (from *killing* to *killing oneself*) and quantification (from *being the brother of* to *being a brother*).

dispositionalist All and only phenomenal properties are dispositional, i.e. make a causal difference only (or, at least: primarily) by causing manifestation events under certain contingent conditions.

response-dependantist All and only phenomenal properties are response-dependent, i.e. such that they or the facts that they are exemplified are at least partially grounded in subjective responses or reactions things like us have under certain circumstances.

secondarist All and only phenomenal properties are ‘secondary’, perhaps such as Locke conceived of them, as secondary in (causal and metaphysical) explanation and as being represented by representations that are not ‘resembling’ them, or their primary bases.

conceptualist All and only phenomenal properties are representational. Like methodological ‘interpretations’, conceptualist accounts take the contrast to lie in ways of thinking of / referring to / conceiving of things, but in contrast to methodologists they take this ontologically seriously.²⁵

All these have the three problems I mentioned, i.e. need an explanation for (i) why knowability implies phenomenality; (ii) why phenomenality implies knowability; (iii) why knowing that *a* has some phenomenal property is knowing how it affects us.

As they mono-dimensionally differ in strength with respect to how broad their conception of phenomenal properties is,²⁶ the severity of the problems they have with either (i) or (ii) varies along the same dimension. ‘Liberal’ positions such as the extrinsicalist account will find it more difficult to account for (i), but less difficult to account for (ii), while for more restrictive positions the reverse will be the case: the more demanding our notion of phenomenal property, the easier it is to show that phenomenality is implied by knowability, but the harder it is to show that the converse.

The most important problem of property dualist interpretations, however, is that we still do not have an explanation why it is *these* properties that are the phenomenal ones. As noted above, such an explanation would have to have three parts:

- (i) A property such that we can know of *x* that *x* has it is phenomenal.
- (ii) A phenomenal property of *x* is such that we can (in principle) know of *x* that *x* has it.
- (iii) Knowing, of some phenomenal property, that something has it is knowing how some thing affects us.

Without explanations of these three types, it is not clear what warrants us in moving from **P4** to **C4**. Also, as an interpretation of Kant, the property-dualist account would be very much incomplete: (i) is needed to make sense of transcendental idealism, i.e. Kant’s claim that we can know things only as they appear. (ii) is needed to make sense of empirical realism, i.e. Kant’s claim that the empirical properties of things are at least in principle within our cognitive grasp. To have an explanation of (iii), at last, is a so-to-say ‘internal’

²⁴This is, of course, only a rough characterisation. The now ‘classic’ Lewis/Langton definition (1998) has been widely criticised and also been superseded by the somehow less committal Lewis definition in *Of the problem cases discussed in this rather large body of literature, the following are I think most relevant for our purposes here:*

²⁵Allen W. Wood says: “...appearances are not distinct entities from things in themselves, but the same entities, conceived or referred to in different ways” (2004: 65). His interpretation of Kant’s solution to the antinomies, however, interprets him as claiming that a series of condition can *be* (not just: be thought of as) a thing-in-itself (2010: 258).

²⁶I will assume, for the purposes of this paper, that every relational property is extrinsic, that dispositional properties are relational (where the extra place is filled by quantification over manifestation events), that response-dependent properties are disposition (where the disposition is to cause a response in us), that secondary qualities are response-dependent (where the ‘response’ is the ‘non-resembling’ representation) and also that conceptualist properties are secondary, being *themselves* ‘representations’ projected (wrongly) onto the world, where nothing corresponds to them.

obligation of dual-aspect theories that are also one-world interpretations: because they do not locate the mind-dependence in the objects, they have to locate them in the properties and (iii) is a minimal requirement for a phenomenal property to be mind-dependent in anything like a Kantian sense. Even if phenomenal properties are all and only the properties we can know, we still need to know how by knowing phenomenal properties we know something about the empirical world and about how we are affected by it. This is not just because, without (iii), or a variant thereof, the restriction of our knowledge to phenomenal properties might be due to there only *being* phenomenal properties. While it is true that each specific version of the property-dualist interpretation will have its own story to tell about some necessary link from phenomenal to noumenal properties,²⁷ the problem they all share is that this link will also have to be robust enough to ground the property identity (iii). Without the intensional, not just the extensional equivalence, even our restricted knowledge is not knowledge how things affect us or how they appear, but just knowledge how things (partly) are.

On all three counts, the extant dual-aspects interpretations fare badly. Let us start with (i) and call properties that satisfy the antecedent “knowable”. Is there any reason to assume that knowable properties are – as such / automatically / in virtue of being knowable – extrinsic, relational, dispositional, response-dependent, secondary or conceptual? I do not see any, and in particular I do not see how something like **P** could provide us with any such reason, speaking, as it does, about the conditions, not the content of knowledge. My knowing (of) some property *F* would make some *F* extrinsic only if it entailed that *F* could not be (fail to be) exemplified without me, or something else entirely different from the thing that has it, existing: it would have to make (the exemplification of) *F* modally dependent on something else. I do not think such an argument is possible.²⁸ Even if we grant (implausibly) necessary covariation of extrinsicness and knowability, however, the account conflicts with empirical realism by reversing the order of explanation: it is in conflict with empirical realism, I presume, to hold that properties are phenomenal (i.e. extrinsic, on this account) *because* they are knowable. Rather, they are knowable because they are phenomenal. The relationalist theory has these problems with (i), and another one as well: while it may be held to be open to discovery whether predicables or more generally qualitative entities have extra argument places,²⁹ no one (and certainly not Kant) has to my knowledge ever given an argument that if we know, e.g., that *a* is red, we have the materials to show that *being red* derives from a relation.³⁰ Dispositionalist and response-dependence theories fare a little better with respect to (i), as it is not entirely implausible that the causal powers of things lie ‘dormant’, as it were, and need manifestations (or, more specifically, subjective responses) to be known. The problem here is to make sure this really goes further than **P**, as it is notoriously difficult to distinguish ‘normal’ effects from those that are had in virtue of the nature of the cause (or part of the cause, if causes are facts): a knowable property has to have some effect on us, to be sure, but why think that without having the capacity to have this effect it would not be what it is? Secondary and conceptualist theories face the problem of justifying (i) head-on, as every attempt to do so looks quite question-begging. I thus conclude that property dualist accounts need a story to tell why knowable properties are phenomenal, and, in so far as they aspire to be interpretations, have to attribute such a story to Kant.

The situation, I think, is still worse with respect to (ii). There is no reason, as far as I see, why extrinsic principles should be knowable, or even better knowable than intrinsic ones. Properties may be extrinsic for a lot of different reasons: some are ‘holistic’ (*being a surprise, being everything there is*), some are ‘maximal’ (a property *F* is maximal if nothing is an *F* if it is a proper part of being an *F*, like *being a table*), others are derelativisations (*being a brother, being left*), while still others are extrinsic for a host of other, quite variegated

²⁷This story may be more plausible in some cases than others. While there is some plausibility to claim that the exemplification of extrinsic, relational and dispositional properties necessitates the exemplification of some intrinsic, non-relational and categorical properties, this is much less clear in the other cases: why could not all properties be response-dependent, secondary or conceptualist? Not only do we need an argument here, but we also have to find one in Kant: otherwise, there’s not much left of his transcendental idealism.

²⁸Remember that we are not talking here of the quite different property *being F and known by me to be so*. This property may plausibly be taken to be extrinsic, and to require my existence for its exemplification. But it is not the property the property-dualist takes to be phenomenal.

²⁹Arguments in favour of yet undiscovered (because ‘inarticulated’) argument places have been given for locational and more generally physical properties by relativity theorists, for tensed properties by some versions of endurantism, for taste predicates, knowledge attributions and epistemic modals by contextualists and for egocentric or ‘de se’ sentences by friends of the ‘essential indexical’.

³⁰Again, it may be held that *being red* really just *is* the property *being red and known by me to be so*. Even if knowledge were the ‘relational’ ingredient, however, this way of de-relativisation will clearly not do. At the very least, knowability-in-principle by beings relevantly like us could be required: but it is not clear that this is a relation.

reasons (*being a 1 £note*, *weighing 1 kg*, *being sincere*, *being Mona Lisa*). The relationalist property-dualist at least narrows down this variation,³¹ but still includes too many. Intuitively, it is only relations to *us*, or subjects relevantly like us, that matter. As the phenomenal properties are monadic, however, this difference has to be located in the relational properties themselves. I do not see how this can be done: the relational property *being to the left*, for example, is clearly knowable in principle if it is had in virtue of the thing standing in the relation *being to the left of to me* – but it may be unknowable, even in principle, if it holds (perhaps exclusively, perhaps necessarily) between things beyond my cognitive reach. A similar problem arises for the dispositionalist: only dispositions to affect us, intuitively, should count – but how do we pick them out in a non question begging way? In the absence of a clear cut *intrinsic* distinction between dispositions such that we could, and could not, know of their manifestations, (ii) seems quite unmotivated. It is not even clear, it seems to me, that being extrinsic, relational or dispositional should make a property *more* knowable, even if we are, in some yet-to-be-specified way the reason why they are such: even then, we may be ‘involved’ in them in ways that do not contribute to our knowing them at all. Response-dependence theories fare a bit better, if (but also: only if) the responses in question are knowable per se. But they also need to claim that the inference from the responses to the properties that depend on it is knowable, and this, I think, is a harder task: suppose, for example and as seems plausible, that many different shades of red produce in me the same red-sensation (which explains my inability to distinguish between them). Even if all these shades of red are grounded in that same red-sensation, I cannot tell on the basis of the red-sensation which property dependent on it was actually its cause or even whether there is such a cause. It will be replied that we do not need an inference to a *specific* categorical property causing the response in us, but just to know, on the basis of the response, that there is such a response. Even for this, I think, it would be required, however, that the response-dependent property wears its being response-dependent on its sleeve, as it were, which is true, at best, of only some response-dependent properties. Secondarist and conceptualist theories have much less problems with the ‘transparency’ they need to postulate to account for (ii), but at the prize that they have much bigger problems with (i).

(iii), finally, is the *pièce de résistance* for property-dualism. Kant says in many places that our knowing only ‘appearances’ means that we only know how things affect or appear to us (and not how they are in themselves). It is entirely unclear to me how property-dualist interpretation can make sense of this. Even if the modal covariance of some extrinsic property is with me, if I am the ‘unarticulated constituent’ of some hiddenly relational property, and if I am essentially part of the triggering conditions of some disposition, knowing that something has this extrinsic, relational or dispositional property falls short of knowing how I am affected, or how the property’s being exemplified appears to me. Suppose I confer to something the extrinsic property *not being the tallest person in room*, the relational property *being a brother* or the dispositional property *burning someone*. It does not follow, and is implausible to claim, that knowing that it is *me* who confers that property is knowing how I am affected by it, or how it appears to me. Response-dependence, secondarist and conceptualist theories fare a little better in that respect, in virtue of their claim that for something to have that phenomenal property is for me to be in a certain state: having a response (or being such that I would have a response if I were normal and in the appropriate circumstances), having a non-resembling idea or conceptualising the property in some way. But it is not clear that these reactions qualify as ‘how the property affects me / appears to me’. Two problems can be distinguished: one is that “the thing” in (iii) need not be the thing that has the property. I could have a red sensation (wearing glasses, of a yellow cube in front of me), while at the same time some other red thing appears to me, but not through that sensation. The other problem is that even holding the thing constant, it does not follow from a property’s being constituted by some response on my part that my epistemic access to the property goes *through* that response. To this, it would be required that in a specific case, my knowing that something in front of me is red just were knowing that it produces a red sensation in me. Even if the red sensation is given to me in a way such that I always know it when I have it, it is only by causal inference, it seems to me, that I can move on to knowledge of its causal source.

³¹And also extends it, if there are relational intrinsic properties. But I leave this aside for now.

3 The dual nature of aspects

3.1 Aspects: dependent extrinsic things (this we discussed in December already – feel free to skip)

Take the cup in front of me and let us call it “Sam”. It is round and white. I claim that there exist two other objects, we may call “Tom” and “Maria” respectively. They are aspects of Sam, existentially, essentially and qualitatively depend on it, but also numerically different. We may call Tom “the cup in so far as it is round”, “the round cup”, “the cup as round”, or “the cup qua round”, though it is not always clear how these terms may be construed as definite descriptions. I will also call Tom by the functional name “Sam qua round”, call “Sam” its basis and the property *being round* its “gloss”. Tom depends on Sam in at least the following ways:

existentially Tom exists because Sam exists and is round.

essentially Tom is essentially round because Sam is round.

qualitatively Tom is round because Sam is round.

Tom depends on Sam not just for its existence in space and time, or its being ‘concrete’, or ‘actualised’, but for its existence *tout court*.³² That it is essentially round does not just mean (or, perhaps, if there may be contingent essences, does not even imply) that it is necessarily round if it exists. It means that roundness is part of what it is, that it could not be the thing it is if it were not round, that roundness is part of its real definition(s).³³ The third condition does not imply that qua-object have all the properties their basis do, nor does it imply that it cannot have any other properties;³⁴ it just means that the properties that Tom and Sam share are exemplified by Tom *derivatively*, because they are exemplified by Sam.

All three “because” have to be understood in the non-causal, distinctively metaphysical and admittedly somewhat elusive sense that is the explanandum of recent theories of grounding. That Tom’s existence is grounded in Sam’s and it’s being round thus means, at least, that Tom is not just a dependent entity, but that it owes its existence not just to some other existence, but to a qualitative fact about the world: this is a feature Tom shares with things normally classified under the category of properties. That Tom’s essence is externally grounded means that Tom is what it is in virtue of a relation to something else and that it is an extrinsic thing in this sense, a thing that can only exist if conditions for its existence that are external to it are satisfied. That even Tom’s roundness is grounded in someone else’s roundness means that Tom is not qualitatively autonomous, that some of the properties it has are ‘inherited’ or ‘reflected’; it also means that there are at least two ways to be round: a thing may be round either just because it itself has a certain shape, or also because something else has a certain shape. I will call these three aspects of Tom’s being grounded in Sam it’s being a ‘qualitative’, ‘extrinsic’ and ‘heteronomous’ thing.

Are such qualitative, extrinsic and heteronomous things real? I think they are, but I do not think that their *definition* gives us this result, nor that we are (at least presently) able to give a full (real) definition of them at all. This is an important difference between my conception of qua-objects and their two (only?) contemporary defenders, Kit Fine and David Lewis.³⁵ Defining qua objects into existence, I think, would only be

³²This distinguishes Tom from propositions and from states of affairs or facts on some conceptions of the latter.

³³I thus employ the nowadays standard Aristotelian non-modal notion of essence re-introduced by Kit Fine (1994).

³⁴The conception of qua-objects Marshall (2013) puts to work in an interpretation of Kant does not allow for this, claiming that “the properties of the qua-object must either be those of the original object, or else arise straightforwardly from the latter; nothing fundamentally new can be added” (2013: 528). We will return to this point later.

³⁵Kit Fine, in a short note entitled “Acts, Events and Things” (1982) introduced qua objects as a special kind of intensional entities, consisting of a particular, say *a* (its ‘basis’), together with a property, say *F* (its ‘gloss’), and denoted by “*a* qua *F*” (Fine 1982: 100). For any particular *a* and any property *F*, Fine claims there is such a qua object, which exists at times and in worlds when and ‘in’ which *a* is *F*. Qua objects in Fine’s sense are intensional entities because they are identical only if they have the same glosses and they are distinct from their bases, though they have them as constituents and exemplify, at any given time and in any given world, all the properties of their bases which are not ‘formal’, i.e. which are not about the time or world in question.

David Lewis, presupposing his own modal realism and his (anti-realist!) semantic theory of *de re* modal predications, takes qua-objects to be things with contextually restricted counterpart relations. Something *b* in a possible world *v* is a counterpart of *a* in *w* relative to context *C* iff, as judged in *C*, *a* would be *b* if *w* turned out to be *v*. Counterpart relations depend on overall intrinsic and extrinsic similarity and sometimes on similarity-in-a-given-respect. It is the relative weights attributed to different respects of similarity that depend on context: Different counterpart relations are distinguished by the fact that they place more relative importance on some of the properties of one and the same thing: one and the same thing, e.g. the lump of matter and the statue, might have counterparts in one respect which are not counterparts of it in another respect, e.g. melted-down counterparts which are sufficiently similar to it with respect to lump-hood, but not to statue-hood. The difficulty is, of course, to say how such counterpart relations are selected and why their being more than one of them does not violate Leibniz’s Law. Lewis (2003) takes Long qua black to be “none other than

appropriate if we could assign them some second-grade status that not only demotes them *metaphysically*, but *ontologically* as well. Both Kit Fine and David Lewis take that route. In 1982, Kit Fine conceived of them as constructed by us³⁶, while in his later theory of ‘rigid embodiments’ he took them to be ‘entities-under-a-description’.³⁷ David Lewis says that it is up to us what to count as counterparts of things.³⁸ But again the restriction of the maximal counterpart relation is done by *us* privileging one aspect of similarity over another.³⁹

In contrast to these two (roughly) contemporary theories, I take qua objects, or aspects, to be *data*, part of the natural world we find ourselves in and of which we have to make sense of, in the way philosophers do.⁴⁰ Just because they are dependent – qualitative, extrinsic and heteronomous – does not make them less real, or more of a projection of ourselves, or more ‘conceptual’, or less ‘objective’ than their bases.⁴¹

I thus think there are entities that are dependent in the ways characterised above and take it to be a question of interpretation, not just of modelling, whether Kant was talking about them.

3.2 Aspects: horizontally grounded things

Aspects, I claim, are real and they are really numerically different from the things they are aspects of. But is this not a variant of phenomenalism? Could aspects really be much more substantial than mere seemings, looks, appearances of things, illegitimately reified as being different from things seeming, looking, or appearing some way or other? The aim of this section is to dispel these worries and to outline an (admittedly sketchy) account of how knowledge of aspects could just *be* knowledge of the things they are aspects of.

My argument why knowledge of aspects constitutes (also) knowledge of their bases is by analogy with the problem of mental causation. Friends of mental causation who are also physicalists (or at least believe in the ‘causal closure of the physical’, that every physical effect has a physical cause) have long worried about systematic causal overdetermination, of which the firing squad is the stock example. Yablo (1992) made some progress on this score, presenting the example of Sophie, a pigeon trained to peck at red specks, presented with a crimson one, and pecking. Shall we say that Sophie’s reaction is overdetermined by it’s being a reaction both to the speck being red and it’s being crimson (to different ways for the speck to be)? No, says Yablo, because the determinate/determinable relation between *being crimson* and *being red* is sufficiently tight for the causal relations not to be overdetermining: the causal powers of the determinable are not a further

Long himself”, but “differ[ing] from him in essence”: “...[Long] has different essences under different counterpart relations. The name ‘Long’ evokes one counterpart relation; the (novel) name “Long qua black” evokes another. The counterparts of Long qua black / Long under the second counterpart relation are just those of his counterparts under the first counterpart relation that are black.” (2003: 31) So Lewis has the following conditions on qua objects: *a* qua *F* exists at *t* in *w* iff *F* is an intrinsic property of *a* at *t* in *w*; *a* qua *F* is identical to *abut* the counterparts of *a* qua *F* are only the counterparts of *a* that are *F*.

³⁶Cf.: “The acts, as qua objects, are in an obvious sense artificial and derivative. They are not genuinely ‘out there’ in the world, but are formed from what is out there by means of an alliance with a purely intensional element. (It is tempting to say that they are partly formed in our own minds, but this would be too psychologistic.)” (Fine 1982: 103)

³⁷Cf.: “An especially important class of cases are those in which the principle of embodiment is a property *P* rather than a polyadic relation *R*. The rigid embodiment is then of the form “*a/P*” and may be read as “*a* qua *F*” or as “*a* under the description *P*.” An airline passenger, for example, is not the same as the person who is the passenger since, in counting the passengers who pass through an airport on a given weekend, we may legitimately count the same person several times. This therefore suggests that we should take an airline passenger to be someone under the description of being flown on such and such a flight. And similarly for mayors and judges and other “personages” of this sort.” (Fine 1999: 67–68) Fine does not, unfortunately, spell out in detail what it means to “take someone under the description of being *F*” and how this action of ours could produce such persons as airline passengers.

³⁸Lewis (1971: 209 / 53) says that “the sense of the term somehow selects the counterpart relation that is to be used to find the counterparts of the thing denoted by that term”, while Lewis (2003: 31) speaks of names “evoking” particular counterpart relations. but also says that we can stipulate that the appropriate counterpart relation is selected by a special clause like “regarded as an *F*”: “Is it a counterpart of Lump/Goliath? Yes and no. It is a counterpart under the counterpart relation that is called to mind when we describe Lump/Goliath as a lump, but not under the different counterpart relation that is called to mind when we describe the very same thing as a statue. [...] Thanks to the multiplicity of counterpart relations, we have no need to multiply entities. [...] One identical thing can have different potentialities and different essences if it has them relative to different counterpart relations.” (Lewis 2003: 28)

³⁹In 1971, Lewis even adopts the ‘under a description’ metaphor. Cf.: “My real essence consists of the properties common to all my counterparts. [...] My nominal essence under the description ‘person’ consists of the properties common to all possible persons. My intermediate essence under the description ‘person’ consists of the properties common to all my personal counterparts.” (Lewis 1971: 54)

⁴⁰My conception of qua objects is thus much closer to Aristotle’s, who took Musical-Coriscus to be as much ‘given’ as Coriscus. For an explanation how this justifies his assimilation of qualitative to substantial change, cf. Matthews (1982). A very interesting contemporary elaboration of the ‘two in being, one in number’ account of aspects is given by Donald Baxter.

⁴¹This, I think it true at least with respect to our ordinary sense of ‘real’, which lines up with what Kit Fine (2001: 3) the conception of reality as what is fundamental. Their dependence does make a difference, I think, with respect to the other, in contemporary metaphysics (though not in meta-ethics) largely neglected conception of the real as what is factual. I elaborate on this elsewhere.

cause with respect to the causal powers of the determinate. Much of the plausibility of this claim will, of course, depend on our account of such causal powers, and not all of such accounts given in the literature are amenable to an interpretation of Kant.⁴²

While it is not subsumable under the determinate/determinable relation (at least as the latter is standardly construed), the same appears to me true of the *being an aspect of* relation. While aspects may have novel properties, their causal relations are constrained, and explicable in terms of, what they are aspects of. Knowledge, I boldly claim, is in this respect similar to causation: to know an aspect is to know that its base has a certain property.

4 Testing the hypothesis

The main reason I have for my interpretation is that it tackles the main problem head-on. The crux in any interpretation of Kant's metaphysics is how to understand, make sense of or even defend the claim that there is numerical identity with qualitative difference, of appearances and what they are appearances of, of what is known and what affects us. If we preserve qualitative difference, as any even remotely plausible interpretation of Kant must, numerical identity, as it is nowadays ordinarily understood, has to be given up – but what can be put in its place? We've seen, in sct. 2, that phenomenalism has no good candidate; in sct. 2.4 it has been argued that coexemplification of mind-dependent and -independent properties is also too weak. My proposal is to replace numerical identity with the strongest suitable *Ersatz* relation: *being an aspect of*.⁴³ An aspect of *a*, as I argued in sct. 3.1, is plausible taken to be “nothing over and above” *a*, even though, as argued in sct. ??, it may have novel properties and thus differ qualitatively from *a*. It is in virtue of this relation, that aspects and their bases do not crowd each other out as relata of causation or of knowledge (cf. sct. 3.1).

4.1 Aspects in the transcendental aesthetics

Kant's transcendental deduction of the concepts SPACE and TIME is laconically brief:

...da nur vermitteltst solcher reiner Formen der Sinnlichkeit uns ein Gegenstand erscheinen, d.i. ein Objekt der empirischen Anschauung sein kann, so sind Raum und Zeit reine Anschauungen, welche die Bedingungen der Möglichkeit der Gegenstände als Erscheinungen a priori enthalten, und die Synthesis in denselben hat objektive Gültigkeit. (A89, B121-122)

The problem is that we need an interpretation of “die Möglichkeitsbedingung von *x* enthalten” substantial enough to imply “auf *x* zutreffen”. The quoted argument proceeds as follows:

- (a) all our possible representations of objects represent them as being in time
- (b) time is a form of pure intuition / only in time can things appear to us
- (c) TIME applies to all things that we can represent

But the step from (b) to (c) is not automatic: that things necessarily appear to us temporally does not imply that they are temporal unless, of course, it is presupposed that they appear to us the way they are. Again, the crucial step is from (1) to (2):

1. to cognize something as an object (etwas als einen Gegenstand erkennen) is (to cognize it) through the representation (Vorstellung) *x*
2. *x* is a priori determining (a priori bestimmend) *in Ansehung* of the object

According to Kant, the inference is valid and is also sound for $x = \{ \text{SPACE, TIME, categories} \}$. The aesthetics establishes (1) for $x = \{ \text{SPACE, TIME} \}$ with respect to the cognition which is Anschauung. The deduction to (2) is then as follows:

⁴²In particular, the most common strategy, known as the ‘subset view’, will not do, for it presupposes the decidedly un-Kantian view that appearances (determinates) can only have causal powers that area also had by what they are appearances of (their determinables).

⁴³The most important contemporary defender of aspects, Donald Baxter, even talks of “aspectival identity” as a kind or type of identity, cf. e.g. 1988b; 1999; 2014, or of “identity in the loose and popular sense” (Baxter 1988a).

Mit dieser formalen Bedingung der Sinnlichkeit [dass wir Anschauung davon haben können] stimmen also alle Erscheinungen notwendig überein, weil sie durch dieselbe erscheinen, d.i. empirisch angeschauet und gegeben werden können. (A93 / B125)

Again, we cannot infer that a necessary condition of our cognition of some object is a condition of that object unless the object is itself some x -qua-cognised. The property-dualism interpretations does not provide warrant for this inference: even if their spatial and temporal properties are extrinsic, relational, disposition, response-dependent or in other ways ‘secondary’, it does not follow from that fact that we have to attribute them to the objects of cognition that these objects in fact have them.

Even if (2) is salvaged, however, this does not yet give us quite what Kant takes to have established: the necessity by which spatiotemporal properties attach to phenomena is not just conditional, but absolute. Guyer puts the point against Allison as follows:

...it is not Kant's view that what we know merely the conditional necessity that if we are to perceive things external to ourselves they must be spatial. Rather, it is Kant's view that what we perceive is *necessarily spatial* in an absolute sense, and that the existence of this absolute necessity can be explained only by the supposition that we actually *impose* spatial form on objects. (1987: 361)

Qua objects are tailor-made to make room for this absolute necessity.

4.2 Our knowledge of things in themselves

While Allison's ‘consideration’ interpretation certainly has massive problems in explaining (away) the identification of appearances with representations, it's fatal problem, in my view, lies elsewhere: though it may be somewhat plausible to holistically paraphrase Kant's talk of appearances as him urging on us a certain way of conceiving of things, clearly his talk of things in themselves does not admit of such an interpretation: talking of things in themselves is plainly *not* a way of conceiving of things. This is obscured by Allison's frequent use of “in abstraction”. We may, if we want, assert that to talk of x in abstraction from the way it appears to us is to conceive of x as a thing in itself, and there is some Kantian pedigree to this way of talking. But as Berkeley's critique of abstract ideas has well shown, this is a purely negative characterisation of how x is conceived: even if we, as we must in a Kantian context, cancel the implicature that we would not normally talk of x as in abstraction from F if x were not F in reality, considering x in abstraction from its being F is neither considering x as being *not* – F nor considering x as not being F , but is nothing more than *not* considering x as being F . But if considering x in abstraction from the way it appears is just not considering it as it appears, then we do not have *two* perspectives, and even much less two perspectives on the same thing.

Perhaps the abstractionist model is not the only one we may appeal to in elucidating Kant's talk of “considering things as they are in themselves”. Two candidates suggest themselves, the one substantial but unavailable, the other one merely formal and unhelpful. Kant often says that an intuitive understanding would cognise things as they are in themselves. Can we therefrom infer that considering things as they are in themselves is considering them the way an intuitive understanding would cognise them? As Reed's talk last week made clear, we cannot: if there is no intuitive understanding, appealing to its possibility does not enlighten us at all about the things in themselves, for they may be quite different from how they would be if there were an intuitive understanding. That an intuitive understanding would not synthesise through categories, would not recognize a distinction between possibility and actuality and would not cognize a distinction between mechanism and teleology does not therefore mean that considering things in themselves is considering them as not categorically structured, as merely possible or as neither under natural nor moral laws.

It is certainly true that considering x as it is in itself is *not* considering it as knowable, or considering as having any property that is entailed by its knowability. While there may be a sense in which not considering x as knowable is, when considering x , a way of considering x as unknowable, this is unhelpful. It will not do, for example, to explain the alleged non-spatiotemporality of noumena simply by pointing out that considering things in themselves is not considering them as spatio-temporal. Because not considering them as spatio-temporal is certainly not the same things as considering them as non-spatio-temporal.

4.3 Aspects in the amphiboly (sent around last time, but not discussed)

The noumena/phaenomena contrast is applied to representations (Vorstellungen) and more particularly to concepts (Begriffe) in the amphiboly of Reflexionsbegriffe. Transcendental reflection there reveals that conceptually based relations between things differ relative to our ground of having these concepts (“der Erkenntnisart, zu der [die Begriffe] gehören”, A 261 / B 317). Depending on the ground (Erkenntnisart / Erkenntniskraft) of the concepts and the source (Erkenntnisquelle) of the Vorstellungen and the Erkenntnisvermögen wherein they “belong together”, there may be (i) different intrinsically indiscernibles, (ii) real contrariety, (iii) ungrounded dispositions and (iv) form that determines, but is not determined by matter. There are thus four contrasts between noumena and phenomena, corresponding to the four pairs of concepts of reflexion: ⁴⁴

1. Intrinsically indiscernible things that “als Gegenst[ä]nde des reinen Verstandes [gelten]” are identical (A 263 / B 319), while also only extrinsically discernible phaenomena (that are, e.g., located in different places) are distinct.⁴⁵
Compared as noumena (and hence in abstraction from their location), two intrinsically indiscernible drops of water are identical; compared as phaenomena, the difference of their locations grounds their non-identity.⁴⁶
2. Parts of reality (Realitäten) as “nur durch den reinen Verstand vorgestellt” cannot be contrary to each other (im Widerstreit), while things that are real “in der Erscheinung” may (A 264 / B 320). Being in harmony with each other, however, means different things with respect to representations and to things represented: for concepts, not being in harmony or being contrary is being logically contradictory (A 272 / B 328); for things, it is to cancel out the other thing’s effects. Such a “wechselseitiger Abbruch” happens, e.g., with two diametrically opposed and equally strong forces acting on the same point.
3. All intrinsic properties of objects of pure reason (“Gegenstände des reinen Verstandes”) are not really relational (ie. do not stand in relations “dem Dasein nach”), while intrinsic properties of spatial phaenomena all are.⁴⁷ An intrinsic determination of a thing in itself cannot be the concept of a relation, not even of a relation between its parts: because things in themselves need to have an intrinsic nature, they must therefore be simple. Determinations of phaenomena, by contrast, may be only comparatively intrinsic, ie. be exemplified in virtue of how the things is by itself (independently of the existence of things wholly disjoint with it), but still be had in virtue of properties of and relations between its parts. With noumena, extrinsic discernibility presupposes numerical non-identity, while the numerical non-identity of phaenomena may consist in such a difference of external relations (“die Verschiedenheit der äusseren Verhältnisse [macht] eine Verschiedenheit der Sachen selbst [aus]”, A 280 / B 336).
4. With respect to pure concepts of reason, matter, as that which is determined, precedes the form that determines it and makes it possible. Reason needs matter, at least conceptual matter (“dass etwas gegeben sei (wenigstens im Begriffe)”, A 2 67 / B 323), before it can impose form (e.g. by combining concepts into judgements). With respect to intuition and its objects, however, form precedes matter

⁴⁴Some passages suggest that the same pair of concepts may stand in different relations relative to the respect of their comparison: they are “als zum reinen Verstande oder zur sinnlichen Anschauung gehörend untereinander verglichen” (A 261 / B317) and their ‘transcendental place’ accrues to concepts relative to the use we make of them (“nach Verschiedenheit [des] Gebrauchs”, A 268 / B 324). This aspects-of-concepts interpretation does not match well, however, with Kant’s talk of concepts *belonging* to different Erkenntniskräfte. Also, it reintroduces the basic problem of the phaenomena/noumena distinction at the conceptual level: how can the same concepts stand in some relation to each other if compared with respect to reason and not stand in this relation if compared with respect to the senses? How can they be the *same* concepts if they differ in (at least) this important respect?

⁴⁵Kant conceptualises the intrinsic indiscernibility of two things as *identity* of their (complete) concepts and claims that in the case of noumena, identity of things is implied by identity of concepts. Kant’s further claim, that the numerical distinctness of differently located intrinsically indiscernible phenomena is grounded in the numerical distinctness of their (equally intrinsically indiscernible) regions, depends on the claim, which Kant denies, that the relation of a region to absolute space is not an intrinsic property of that region.

If we adopt the interpretation described in footnote (45) and see the contrast as between comparisons of the same concepts, taken one or the other way, we can interpret Kant more weakly here: as only saying that Leibniz would have been right if he would have been (entitled to) talking about noumena, and not making any positive claim about noumena himself.

⁴⁶In the ‘one-concept’ interpretation of fn. 45, the contrast would be: compared as having objects knowable only by reason, DROPI and DROPI2 have the same object, compared as having objects given to us by intuition, they don’t.

⁴⁷The claim is indeed this sweeping: “die inneren Bestimmungen einer substantia phaenomenon im Raume [sind] nichts als Verhältnisse, und sie selbst ganz und gar ein Inbegriff von lauter Relationen” (A 265 / B 321).

and makes it – as a phaenomenon, ie. object of an intuition – possible.

We thus have the following claims:

identity/difference V_1 and V_2 are representations of droplets:

if V_1 and V_2 are intellectual: $\Box(R(V_1)$ is identical_R to $R(V_2) \leftrightarrow V_1$ is the same concept)as V_2)

if V_1 and V_2 are intuitive: $\Diamond(R(V_1)$ is not identical_V to $R(V_2) \wedge R(V_1)$ is intrinsically indiscernible to $R(V_2)$)

harmony/repugnance V_1 and V_2 are representations of contrary emotions (pleasure and pain):

if V_1 and V_2 are intellectual: $\Box(R(V_1)$ is in harmony_R with $R(V_2) \leftrightarrow V_1$ is logically consistent with V_2)

if V_1 and V_2 are intuitive: $\Diamond(R(V_1)$ is not in harmony_I with $R(V_2) \wedge R(V_1)$ cancels out the effects $R(V_2)$)

inner/outer V_1 is the representation of a determination of x .

if V_1 is intellectual: $\Box(R(V_1)$ is an intrinsic_R determination of $x \leftrightarrow V_1$ is a non-relational concept)

if V_1 is intuitive: $\Diamond(R(V_1)$ is an intrinsic_I determination of $x \wedge R(V_1)$ is a relation between parts of x)

form/matter V_1 and V_2 are any representations whatsoever:

if V_1 and V_2 are intellectual: $\Box(R(V_1)$ is the form_R of $R(V_2) \leftrightarrow V_2$ makes V_1 possible)

if V_1 and V_2 are intuitive: $\Diamond(R(V_1)$ is the form_I of $R(V_2) \wedge R(V_1)$ makes $R(V_2)$ possible)

The left-hand sides of the biconditionals have to be taken with a grain of salt: strictly speaking, all positive claims we can make about noumena are in reality claims about their concepts; we can only ‘reflect logically’ and determine relations between their concept:

Wenn wir bloss logisch reflektieren, so vergleichen wir lediglich unsere Begriffe unter einander im Verstande, ob beide dasselbe enthalten [identity_R], ob sie sich widersprechen oder nicht [harmony_R], ob etwas in dem Begriffe innerlich enthalten sei, oder zu ihm hinzukomme [intrinsic_R], und welcher von beiden gegeben, welcher aber nur als eine Art, den gegebenen zu denken, gelten soll [form_R]. (A 279 / B 335)

Property-dualist interpretations have a major problem, it seems to me, to make sense of Kant’s clear assertion that Leibniz’s principle of the identity of indiscernibles holds of “concepts of things as such” (“von Begriffen der Dinge überhaupt gilt”, A 272 / B 328):

...wenn ich einen Tropfen Wasser als ein Ding an sich selbst nach allen seinen innern Bestimmungen kenne, so kann ich keinen derselben von dem anderen für verschieden gelten lassen, wenn der ganze Begriff desselben mit ihm einerlei ist. Ist er aber Erscheinung im Raume, so hat er seinen Ort nicht bloss im Verstande (unter Begriffen), sondern in der sinnlichen äusseren Anschauung (im Raume), und da sind die physischen Örter, in Ansehung der inneren Bestimmungen der Dinge, ganz gleichgültig...(A 272 / B 328)

Kant here says that the very same droplet of water may be known as a thing by itself and also be a phaenomenon in space. This already rules out an interpretation of aspects as sets or bundles of properties. If the noumenon / phaenomenon distinction were one between properties, then there is no sense available in which one and the same thing can be known, be or be considered as both a noumenon and a phaenomenon.⁴⁸

There is a further, more important problem here for property-dualist interpretations, however. If we interpret Kant’s claim that the PII holds of noumena as asserting that commonality of noumenal (intrinsic, categorical, response-independent) properties suffices for identity, then his claim that it does *not* hold of phenomena is illogical nonsense: if two things sharing their noumenal properties are *already* identical, then there are no two things for the phenomenal properties to differentiate.⁴⁹

There is no such a problem for an aspect interpretation, on the other hand. The very same thing a , in itself, may have two aspects, e.g. a -qua-being-here and a -qua-being-there. To take two water droplets located in different places to be one and the same is to viciously abstract from their aspectual diversity. This

⁴⁸This is a version of the ‘object of knowledge’ objection above.

⁴⁹This follows from the converse of the PII, the indiscernibility of identicals, which is far more plausible.

corresponds well with Kant's own gloss on the matter. Leibniz's mistake to take the indiscernibility of identicals to hold not just of noumena, but of phenomena as well, is put in terms of forgetting about what was abstracted from:

Weil aber bei dem blossen Begriffe von irgend einem Dinge von manchen notwendigen Bedingungen einer Anschauung abstrahiert worden, so wird, durch eine sonderbare Übereilung, das, wovon abstrahiert wird, dafür genommen, dass es überall nicht anzutreffen sei, und dem Dinge nichts eingeräumt, als was in seinem Begriffe enthalten ist. (A 281 / B 337-338)

Kant says here that Leibniz, thinking to be able to sensibly talk about noumena, abstracted from the extrinsic (i.e. spatio-temporal) properties that may distinguish intrinsically identical phenomena, took them to be non-existent and thus inferred the identity of things from the identity of their concepts. He mistook, in other words, aspects for their bases.

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