eidos -- the Centre in Metaphysics of the University of Geneva

Fourth eidos meeting, 5th to 7th March 2008, Geneva

Click here for a program.

Wednesday, 5th of March

  • 10-12: Julien Deonna, Fabrice Teroni, What is an emotion? (room B104, Uni Bastion)
  • 13-14: Philipp Keller, Kevin Mulligan, Intermediate report of the FNS project (room U 259, Uni Dufour)
  • 14-16: Ghislain Guigon, A puzzle about Conjunctions and Truthmaking (room U 259, Uni Dufour)
  • 16-18: Kevin Mulligan, The Metaphysics of Values (room A109, Aile Jura)

Thursday, 6th of March

  • 9-11: Andri Töndury, Is epistemic justification at bottom pragmatic? (room SO 019, Saint-Ours)
  • 11-13: Fabian Dorsch, Phenomenal Error (room SO 019, Saint-Ours)
  • 14-16: John Zeimbekis, Substantive and Deflationist Aesthetic Value (rue des Battoirs 7)
  • 16-18: Stephan Leuenberger, Global Supervenience (rue des Battoirs 7)

Friday, 7th of March

  • 10-12: Olivier Massin, Forces and Causation (room SO 019, Saint-Ours)
  • 14-16: Stephan Leuenberger, Ramsification (room A112, Aile Jura)
  • 16-18: Anne Meylan / Olivier Massin, The Hedonistic Value of Justification (room SO 019, Saint-Ours)
  • 18-20: Akiko Frischhut, How do persons persist? (room B105, Uni Bastions)


For all inquiries, please contact the organiser, Philipp Keller.


Andri Töndury, Is epistemic justification at bottom pragmatic?
I discuss three recent defenses of the thesis, in one form or another, that epistemic justification is at bottom pragmatic. I argue that these views are ill-motivated. Finally (I hope) I will draw some general conclusions about the relevance of principles of practical rationality for epistemic rationality.

preparatory reading:

Fabian Dorsch, Phenomenal Error
This is a first draft on a paper on the possibility of conscious mental episodes phenomenally seeming to us to be other than they really are. The ideas and arguments are already pretty much there, but the final version will be less dense and providing more dialectical guidance. So please just focus on the content, and not the presentation (unless there are some serious unclarities, of course). I'm working on this issue together with Gianfranco Soldati who also wrote a complementary first draft. The plan is in the end to combine the two drafts in one longish paper. The link to the epistemology of values is that the idea of an intentional nature of phenomenal consciousness can then be used to elucidate the idea of a phenomenal experience of reasons for evaluations - as the basis for an inference to the value, and as an alternative to emotional, perceptual and similar accounts.