Against the Necessity of Necessity

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1 The necessity of necessity

1. it is necessary that there is necessity (we ought to believe that at least some modes of inferences are logically necessarily truth-preserving)
2. the necessity there is is necessary
   (a) our theory of modality is necessary
   (b) if it is necessary that p, then it is necessary that it is necessary that p

2 The modal status of necessities

(AP)
- (AP1) It is a priori knowable that p.
- (AP2) If is a priori knowable that p it is a priori knowable that it is a priori knowable that p.
- (AP3) So it is a priori knowable that it is a priori knowable that p.
- (AP4) It is necessary that p because it is a priori knowable that p.
- (AP5) So it is a priori knowable that is is necessary that p.
- (AP6) It is necessary that it is necessary that p because it is a priori knowable that is is necessary that p.
- (AP7) So it is necessary that it is necessary that p.

(1) If p is true, p is necessarily true.

(2) If p is true, p is a priori.

(3) $\Box$(If $a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_n$ exists, then p)

(4) if cyborgs would exist, it would be necessary that they feed on humans

(5) if there were no humans, cyborgs could not exist

3 The very idea of necessarily necessary truths

(S) (S1) Modal truths supervene on non-modal truths.
(S2) If things were different, modal properties were differently distributed.
(S3) If some (actual or possible) things differ in modal properties, then they differ in non-modal properties

4 The modal status of our theory of modality

(FK) (FK1) I have internal warrant that it is necessary that F is a's fundamental kind.
(FK2) II have internal warrant that, if something is necessary, then it is true.
(FK2) II have internal warrant that, if F is a's fundamental kind, then a is F.
(FK3) So I have internal warrant that a is F.

The primary intension of a concept, unlike the secondary intension, is independent of empirical factors: the intension *specifies* how reference depends on the way the external world turns out, so it does not itself depend on the way the external world turns out. (**?**: 57)

"Given that we have the ability to know what our concepts refer to when we know how the actual world turns out, then we have the ability to know what our concepts would refer to *if* the actual world turned out in various ways." (**?**: 59–60)[1]

Possession of a concept bestows a *conditional ability* to identify the concept's extension, given information about hypothetical epistemic possibilities (in the broad sense of "epistemic possibility", invoking hypotheses about the actual world that are not ruled out a priori). (**?**: 5)

5 The necessity of our belief in necessity

(specifiability)	"...if this $[\blacklozenge(p \to q)]$ *is* a possibility, we ought to be able to describe the circumstances in which it would be realized: let them be described by $[r]$" (**?**: 138)
('deduction theorem')	If $\Box(p \to q)$, then the argument from p to q is valid.
(monotonicity)	If the argument from p to q is valid, then so is the argument from p and r to q is valid.
(conditionalisability)	If the argument from p and r to q is valid, we are entitled to assert "if p and r were the case, then q would be the case".
(choice of r)	If $\neg\blacksquare(p \to q)$, then it is not assertible that if p and r were the case, then q would be the case.

There are context in which a speaker is entitled to assert the subjunctive conditional "Had it been that P, it would have been that Q" only when it is metaphysically necessary that if P then Q. So to make McFertridge's second assumption is already to assume that whenever a conditional is logically necessary it is also metaphysically necessary. (**?**: 477-478)

[1] Cf. also (**?**: 612).

> Logical rules may reduce a given supposition to absurdity without reducing to absurdity the distinct supposition that the first supposition is not statable. (**?**: 481)

(6) If $\Box(p \to q)$, then $\neg\blacklozenge(p \wedge \neg q)$

(MF1) If $\Box(p \to q)$ then $\Box(p \wedge r \to q)$
(MF2) $\Box(p \to p)$
(MF3) If $\Box(p \to q)$ and $\Box(p \to r)$ then $\Box(p \to q \wedge r)$
(MF4) If $\blacklozenge p$ and $\Box(p \to q)$ then $\blacklozenge q$
(MF5) $\neg\blacklozenge(p \wedge \neg p)$

It follows that "there is no sense in which it is possible that the $[p]$ is true and $[q]$ is false" (**?**: 97).

(7) $\blacklozenge(p) \quad \wedge \quad p \vdash q \quad \Longrightarrow \quad \blacklozenge(q)$

(8) $\vdash p \quad \Longrightarrow \quad \neg\blacklozenge\neg(p)$

1. whatever is possible should be such that it may be, in some sense, stipulated to be the case
2. we may validly bring out the commitments of our suppositions by logical reasoning

(Neptune) (N1) Suppose Neptune did not exist.
(N2) Now, if Neptune did not exist, the observed irregularities in the orbit of Uranus would not be caused by the presence of another planet.
(N3) So $\blacklozenge$(the irregularities are not caused by the presence of another planet).

(Julius) (J1) Suppose "Julius" refers to the inventor of the zip.
(J2) If Julius invented the zip, noone else could have.
(J3) So, under this supposition, noone other than Julius could have invented the zip.

> …for this representation [of (**??**) as a contingent a priori truth] to be right, we must add that the stipulation in question was made in each of the worlds i, j and k. One who did not know about the stipulation, or did not understand it, would not know that the statement was true. (**?**: 15)

(Form) (F1) Suppose it were the case that p.
(F2) Now, if p were the case, then q would be the case.
(F3) So $\blacklozenge(q)$.

(Animal) (A1) Suppose this animals has four legs.
(A2) If "tails" means "legs", this animals has four tails.
(A3) So $\blacklozenge$(this animal has four tails).

(Exchange) (I1) If I were you, I would be happy.
(I2) If I were you, you would be happy.
(I3) So, if I were you, both of us would be happy.

(Empathy) (E1) Suppose I were you and be happy.
(E2) If I were you and happy, you would be happy.
(E3) So, if I were you and happy, both of us would be happy.

(I_2) ($I_2$1) Suppose I were you
($I_2$2) Now, if I were you, I would not be me.
($I_2$3) So ⧫(I am not me).