


# Pautz on Color Eliminativism

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Aim: assuming primitivism, arguing against three argument for the realist against the eliminativist variant.

Three assumptions, shared by realist primitivists:

1. Differences in colour experiences entail differences in colours presented.
2. Ascriptions of colour *C* are true iff the object in question has *C*.
3. The same colour may produce different colour experiences in different perceivers

Against the **Moorean argument**, that Realism (given Primitivism) is part of common sense:

1. Campbell's response-independent colours (1993) do not make a difference to the evolution of trichromatic colour vision in humans. To avoid Cornman's epiphenomenalism, Campbell has to postulate chromatic laws, according to which primitive colours are metaphysically necessitated by certain physical properties. But these are not biologically significant: evolutionary changes only concern what primitive colours objects appear to have, not what colours they really have. Because there is no evolutionary advantage in perceiving the 'right' primitive colours of objects, primitive colours are evolutionarily idle, which makes it probable that we fail to perceive the true colour of almost every object, assuming that every object only has one fully determinate colour (per colour space). This is equally anti-commonsensual than Eliminativism.

Objection: there is evolutionary pressure also towards uniformity of colour perception, at least within a given species – the best way to achieve this is to produce visual systems that match the real colours.

2. McGinn's response-dependent colours (1996) co-evolve with colour systems, but, given variation of both perceptual systems and optimal conditions, there is no non-arbitrary way to say which colours systems and which conditions determine what primitive colours objects have. One single object therefore exemplifies different non-relational fully determinate McGinnian colour, which is equally anti-commonsensual than Eliminativism.

Objection: the response-dependent primitivist realist is not committed to neither the Liberal, the Chauvinistic or the Error-Theoretic reading of the bi-conditional "for every primitive colour *c* and surface *x*, *x* has *c* iff *x* is disposed to produce an experience as of *c* in creatures of kind *K* under conditions *L*".

Against the **Perceptual Argument**, that we have perceptual knowledge of Realism: We have perceptual knowledge only in the absence of defeaters; and the two arguments above are defeaters.

Objection: if there are defeaters, they are defeaters of the wrong kind (that was Moore's point).

Against the **Psychosemantic Argument** (for response-independent Realism), that the best explanation of our representations ('sensory entertainings') of primitive colours is that they are veridical: There is no reason to assume that there is such an explanation at all. And even if there is any, the most promising ('output-based') theories do not require the veridicality of the representations in question.