Consciencia e intencionalidad

Philipp Keller, UNAM, philipp@filosoficas.unam.mx

4 credits, Programa 40, Posgrado en Filosofía
Lunes 10-12, Aula 4, IIF

Página web: http://www.philosophie.ch/philipp/teaching/mente.shtml
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Programa provisional

1. Introducción: lo que representamos y lo que sentimos (primera semana)

Introducciónes generales:
- Lowe (2000)
- Heil (1998)

Reader: Chalmers (2002)

2. La pregunta por los fundamentos (semanas 2-5)

- teorías de la identidad: Place (1956)
- functionalismo: Block (1980)
- las relaciones entre lo más y lo menos fundamental: Leuenberger (2008)
- razones y causas: Davidson (1970)
- la causalidad mental: Robb and Heil (2003)
- epifenomenalismo: Yablo (1992)

3. Lo que representamos (semanas 6-10)

Lectura general: Gendler/Hawthorne, *Perceptual Experience*.
- la percepción: Grice (1961)
- la teoría de los datos sensoriales: Jackson (1977)
- el representacionalismo: Harman (1990)
- el contenido no-conceptual: Byrne (2005)
- el disyuntivismo: Byrne and Logue (2008)
- la memoria: Martin (1992)

4. Lo que sentimos (semanas 11-14)

Lectura general: Chalmers, *The Conscious Mind*.
- el dualismo Cartesiano: Hawthorne (2007)
- los argumentos modales en favor del dualismo: Kripke (1980), tercera conferencia
- los argumentos fenomenológicos en favor del dualismo: Nagel (1974)
- María y los zombies: Jackson (1986)
- la consciencia: Block (2002)
- el 'hard problem': Block (2003)
- los qualia: Block (1994)
- la repuesta de Lewis: Lewis (1994)
- la brecha explicativa I: Block and Stalnaker (1999)
- la brecha explicativa II: Chalmers and Jackson (2001)
- la brecha explicativa III: Byrne (2006)
- los hechos de la perspectiva: Shoemaker (2006)

Lo que representamos

Distinguimos:

1. S ve que p.
2. S ve x.

Condiciones de éxito:

1. Una convicción que p es exitosa (verdadera) ssi p.
2. Una percepción que p es exitosa (verídica) ssi p.
3. Una emoción que p es exitosa (correcta) si p.

Teorías internistes y externalistas del contenido.

Lo que sentimos

El ejemplo de Maria.
Los "qualias": aspectos non-representativos de nuestros estados mentales? saber que vs. saber cómo?

Las relaciones entre lo que sentimos y lo que representamos

Lo que tienen en común: la perspectivalidad.

El disyuntivismo

Problema: ¿cómo podemos dar cuenta de la relación perceptual con el mundo físico dadas situaciones perceptuales en las que no somos conscientes de objetos físicos, ni de las propriedades de los objetos percibidos?

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