

BECAUSE, BECAUSE, BECAUSE

Kevin Mulligan

The Family

Because, since, puisque, car, comme, why (cf. Blochowiak), because of, in virtue of, wegen.

She left because of Sam/She did it for Sam's sake

Explain, ground, make, "sufficient reason"

Explanation - personal vs impersonal:

- 1 The fact that p grounds/explains_{impersonal} the fact that q
- 2 q because p
- 3 (1) because (2)
- 4 *The proposition/thought that p explains_{impersonal} the fact/proposition/thought that q
- 5 x explained to y why/how/who/what...(cf Witters)
- 6 x makes y true/possible/obligatory/probable/good/shameful/right.....
necessitate, valify, probabilise.....
- 7 because/explains, if/consequence

Making – Steward 1997, Mulligan 2007

If vs Because vs Therefore

- 1 p because q & r
- 2 p in part because q (Correia)
- 3 p because q, r (Correia)
- 4 $\langle q, r, s \rangle$ (partially) grounds p (Bolzano)
- 5 p because (q because r) - embedding
- 6 p because q \rightarrow (p & q) – factivity; cf $q \rightarrow p$
- 7 Not (p because p) – cf $p \rightarrow p$
- 8 p because q \rightarrow "p" and "q" not synonymous
- 9 $G(\text{the fact that } q, \text{ the fact that } p) \rightarrow \text{the fact that } p \neq \text{the fact that } q$
- 10 (p because q & q because r) \rightarrow p because r
- 11 p because q \rightarrow Not(q because p)
- 12 The **relation** of grounding/impersonal explanation as transitive, asymmetric, irreflexive
- 13 Connectives vs relations - hyperintensionality, transparency
- 14 If $\langle p \rangle$ is true because p, then the redundancy theory of truth is false.
- 15 (p) (q) p because q iff q & q \rightarrow p (reductivism)
- 16 Not [(q & q \rightarrow q) \rightarrow q because q]

Against factivity - Dancy 2000 131-7

Against asymmetry – Blochowiak 2006....

Against transitivity – Bolzano

- 17 *Not(je pense, donc je suis)
 18 Proof/demonstration = valid argument with true premises (= sound argument) such that conclusion B premises
 vs
 19 Valid argument = counterpart of a weakened explanation

Types of because

Distinguishing the different "because" is an important phenomenological task (Husserl Hua IV S. 381)

Different "because's" vs different senses of "because" (cf. different "if's" vs different senses of "if")

the because of the exasperated adult

p because p !

the causal because

Sam had a heart attack because he was terrified

the because of theoretical reduction

This is a water molecule because it consists of two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom

the because of subjective reasons for actions (beliefs, desires, emotions)

Sally slapped Sam because she believed him to be a sexist

the because of objective reasons for actions (beliefs, desires, emotions)

Sally slapped Sam because he is a sexist

the normative because

This is intrinsically valuable because it is a state of pleasure

the essential because

If the proposition that p is true and p, then the proposition that p is true because_{essence} p

If the judgement that p is right and p then the judgement that p is right because_{essence} p (Aristotle)

The proposition that p & q is true because (the proposition that p is true and the proposition that q is true) (cf. Bolzano)

the because of essence

If x endures/occurs/obtains/is alive/enjoys intentional existence/ist-zum-Tode..., then x endures/occurs/obtains/is alive/enjoys intentional existence/ist-zum-Tode... because_{essence} of (in virtue of) the essence of x
 Essence explains modes of being

If x and y are numerically distinct, then x and y are numerically distinct because_{essence} of the essences of x and y

Essence explains numerical difference (difference making)

the essential because and the because of essence

If the proposition that p is true because_{essential} the state of affairs that p obtains, then ((the proposition that p is true because_{essential} the state of affairs that p obtains) because_{essence} of (in virtue of) the nature (essence) of truth and of propositions

vs

If the proposition that p is true because_{essential} the state of affairs that p obtains, then ((the proposition that p is true because_{essential} the state of affairs that p obtains) because_{essence} of (in virtue of) the nature (essence) of states of affairs and obtaining

x grounds y in virtue of the nature of x

vs

x grounds y in virtue of the nature of y

He is at home because his fire is burning is (because_{justification})

If he is at home because his fire is burning, then p (because_{causal})

(Tim Williamson)

Equivalences, Analysis and Because

- 1 p iff q
- 2 if (p & q), p because q or q because p or neither ?
- 3 Examples
- 4 p iff_{analysis} q (p is the *analysandum* and q its *analysans*)
- 5 If (p & q), then p because q
- 6 (4) \rightarrow (5) ?
- 7 If the *analysans* contains a because claim, then any analysis of “p because q” – e.g. (8) - will be circular.
- 8 p because q iff_{analysis} q & q \rightarrow p

In Virtue of, Essential Because vs Because of essence

- 1 Variety: in virtue of the essence of x, the property F, the concept F
- 2 Unity: relation vs non-relation: x-makes y true in-virtue-of-the-essence-of x, because of the essence of x, because x has the essential properties it has
- 3 Sam is a member of the class of the sad
- 4 Sam is sad
- 5 (3) because_{essential} (4)
- 6 (5) because_{essence} ?

- 7 The proposition that Fx is true because_{essential} Fx
 8 (7) because_{essence} ?
 9 x promises to $F \rightarrow x$ is obliged to F because_{essence} of the nature of promising

Subjective & Objective Reasons – Because, In Order to, Out of Normative Because and Normative Necessitation

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