

**Kriegel, U. *Intentional Inexistence and Phenomenal Intentionality*. *Phil Pers* 21 (2007) 307-340**

(1) Same problem: non-existent intentional objects. Two-step solution: (i) phenomenal intentionality is non-relational (ii) non-conscious intentionality is derivative

(3) Inconsistent triad: (a) one can represent non-existents  
(b) one cannot bear a relation to non-existents  
(c) intending something constitutively involves bearing a relation to it

(4) Kriegel: reject (c). Conscious intendings of  $x$  are intendings of  $x$  in virtue of their non-relational phenomenal character (non-conscious intendings are so in virtue of relations to conscious intending and so not in virtue of relations to what they intend). Rejections of (a), (b) implausible.

(5) Rejecting (a). Amounts to the claim that one cannot represent non-existents. Two readings.

(5.1) the subject is not thinking anything at all (strong semantic externalism)

(5.2) the subject is thinking of something other than dragons: abstract objects, mental objects etc, existing physical objects of some other strange kind, etc.

(6) Rejecting (b). Implausible to hold that intentional relations are the exception to a general rule: only intentional relations can have non-existent relata. What about other non-intentional relations, eg "lions are smaller than dragons". Kriegel: this is an ellipsis for "if there were dragons, then they would be larger than lions". Cannot take the ellipsis line for " $S$  thinks of a dragon", for this is not counterfactual.

(7) Reject (c): representing something does not constitutively involve bearing a relation to it.

(8) Ducasse/Chisholm: arguing against the sense-data theory, not directly concerned with intentional inexistence per se. Kriegel: extend adverbialism to all intentionality (by the two-step approach).

Three problems

(10) Jackson's problem (11) Externalism implies relationality (12) The non-relational property is entirely mysterious

(13) Rejecting (c): non-derived intentionality is non-relational; derived intentionality is relational, but not to the purported intentional object. The non-derived intentionality is "phenomenally conscious" intentionality.

(16) "I want to suggest that a restricted adverbialism might work for the intentionality of phenomenally conscious mental states, or more accurately, the intentionality phenomenal consciousness states *have in virtue of being* phenomenally conscious states. For this form of intentionality, independently dubbed *phenomenal intentionality* by Loar (2002) and Horgan and Tienson (2002), there is a non-relational property that is a good candidate for constituting the property of representing Bigfoot-wise, namely the presentation's phenomenal character". (p317). this is the suggestion for the mysterious property in (12).

(17) The conscious representation of Bigfoot, represents Bigfoot in virtue of instantiating this non-relational property and not in virtue of bearing a relation to Bigfoot (contrast with the intrinsic properties of non-conscious representations: they represent in virtue of being related to this) Hence, nowhere is Bigfoot implied. The non-relational property is the phenomenal character of the representing, and this itself is intentional.

(19) Formally. (1) some phenomenally conscious states are intentional, and intentional in virtue of being phenomenal (2) these states' phenomenal character is a non-relational property; hence (3) some phenomenally conscious states are intentional, and this intentionality is a non-relational property.

Two arguments in favour of this:

(21) Phenomenal character implies accuracy and accuracy implies representational content: to be in a phenomenal state is to be in a state that is either accurate or inaccurate, and, therefore, to be in a state with content. These accuracy conditions are equivalent over phenomenally indistinguishable experiences: if the what-it's-likeness is the same so are the accuracy conditions.

(22) "Phenomenal internalism": phenomenal character is non-relational. Phenomenal character is *constitutively* independent of any casual or otherwise external factors. Exact BIV duplicates of yourself have the same phenomenal experiences, yet they lack the Putnamesque connections to external objects. Hence this mental element, the phenomenal element, is non-relational. This non-relational element bears the intentionality. Hence intentionality is non-relational.

(24) "The picture we get is one where many conscious states involve something like *intrinsic phenomenal directedness*: some sort of phenomenally constituted non-relational feature of being directed-at-something. In an adverbial vein, we might say that a visual experience of a rabbit has the non-relational phenomenal property of being rabbit-ward-esque (i.e. intrinsically directed at a rabbit) and a visualization of Bigfoot has the non-relational phenomenal property of Bigfoot-ward-esque (intrinsically directed at Bigfoot) ... the best way to wrap one's mind around the notion of phenomenal directedness is by triangulation from the various theoretical constraints on it. That is to say, the best answer to the question "what is phenomenal directedness?" is: it is the kind of property instantiated by a space soul having camel experiences that are transparent to introspection!" (p322)

**Kriegel, U. *The dispensability of (merely) intentional objects*, Phil Studies (2008) 141: 79-95**

(1) def: "intentional object":  $x$  is an intentional object iff an intentional state  $y$  is directed at  $x$

"merely intentional object":  $x$  is a merely intentional object iff

(i)  $x$  is an intentional object of an act  $y$

(ii) if there was no  $y$ ,  $x$  would not exist

(2) Should we commit to the existence of merely intentional objects?

(3) The veridical-case intentional object.  $S$  sees the  $x$  (via the act  $y$ ). The existence of the  $x$  does not rest on its status as the object of  $y$ .

(4) The non-veridical-case *merely* intentional object.  $S$  has a hallucination (as) of the  $x$  (via the act  $y$ ). Kriegel: the "natural thing to say" is that there is no intentional object. The i-o *would* be the tree, if it existed, but it does not, so there is no i-o. Thus there is nothing about hallucinatory phenomena that implies the existence of merely i-o.

(5) Reconstruction of the argument that introduces merely i-o.

(5.1) If  $S$  sees an  $x$ , via act  $y$ , then there is an  $x$  such that it is the i-o of  $y$

(5.2)  $x$ -seings and  $x$ -hallucinatings are tokens of the same intentional type

(5.3) Intentional acts of the same type have intentional objects of the same type; hence

(5.4) If  $S$  hallucinates an  $x$  via act  $y$  then there is an  $x$  such that  $x$  is the int. obj. of  $y$

(6) Metaphysics of "hallucinata": abstract objects; mental concreta; non-existent non-mental concreta. Desirable to avoid these.

Aside: Argument A

\*

(7) Act-object intentional theories: if  $S$  is in intentional state with int. obj.  $x$ , then  $S$  bears an of-ness relation to  $x$ .

    existent-object view: thinking of dragons involves bearing an of-ness relation to *existing* dragons, which are abstract or concrete mental dragons

    object view: thinking of dragons involves bearing a relation to physical, but non-existent dragons

(8) Adverbial intentional theories: if  $S$  is in an intentional state with int. obj.  $x$ , then it is not part of  $S$ 's being in  $y$  that  $S$  bears an of-ness/intending relation to  $x$ , rather he intends (sees, thinks, etc)  $x$ -ly.

    inferentialist view: to be intending  $x$ -ly is to be in an intentional state with  $x$ -ish inferential or functional role

    phenomenal view: to be intending  $x$ -ly is to be in a intentional state with  $x$ -ish phenomenal character, where  $pc$  is "whatever property the phenomenal gap concerns"

(10) Adverbialism denies (5.3): some intentional states do not have objects, for example hallucinations, in that to undergo them is not to bear a relation to, for example, hallucinata.

(11) Pleonastic adverbial paraphrasing: "The dragon I dreamt of last night was yellow" (quantifies over dragons)- "I dreamt of a yellow dragon last night" (possibly requires dragons-constituted truth-makers) - ""I dreamt yellow-dragon-wise last night" (no ontological requirements)

(12) Two-place relations cannot be instantiated where one relata does not exist any more than a monadic property could be instantiated where there is no particular that instantiates it (eg an instantiation of squareness but without there being squares)

Argument for adverbialism: (12.1) we can intend  $x$  even if there is no  $x$

    (12.2)  $SRx$  is impossible if there is no  $x$

    (12.3) we can intend  $x$  without bearing a relation to  $x$

(13) Ontological "can of worms" that is merely-intentional-objects avoided: (1) non-derivative (fundamental) dragon-intendings are dragon-intendings in virtue of intending dragon-wise, *not* in virtue of bearing an intending relation to dragons (insert preferred weird ontological status); (2) derivative dragon intendings are so in virtue of bearing a derivative relation to fundamental dragon-intendings.

(14) Adverbialism makes sense of intentional failure of existential generalization (it does not follow from  $S$ 's intending  $x$ , that there is an  $x$  that is intended by  $x$ )

(15) Adverbialism makes sense of failure of co-referential substitution (it does not follow that if  $S$  believes  $Fa$ ,  $a=b$ , that  $S$  believes  $Fb$ )

(16) Adverbialism makes sense of the fact that one cannot bear a relation to a Greek who is neither blue nor green-eyed, yet one can think of a Greek who is neither green nor blue-eyed for one can represent Greek-ly without representing blue-eyed or green-eyed-Greek-ly.

(17) Jackson's problem (to be returned to)

## Comments

(1) Kriegel conflates perceptual and non-perceptual conscious intentionality. Perceptual and non-perceptual conscious intentionality should be treated differently. My belief that Bigfoot lives in the forest may be analyzed in different ways (eg Russell) but all of the acceptable ways, however, treat this belief as *de dicto*: it is not a belief about a particular Bigfoot. A hallucination of Bigfoot is a hallucination of *that* "Bigfoot". This puts more pressure for thicker some kind of reification of hallucinata - indeed, the object here does have clear phenomenal properties at least of the type *being phenomenally indistinguishable from brownness*. This is something that is deniable in the non-perceptual case. So, concentrate on perception.

(3) Once we have the act-object distinction back, a relational structure to perception is inevitable. All that the basic theory of intentionality says is that an intentional object is presented to a subject via a state/content that relates the subject consciously to that object. Further elaborations are optional: the object is always immanent and mental (Brentano, sense-data), always immanent, concrete and non-mental (some disjunctivists), always immanent and sometimes concrete, sometimes not (Meinong, what the disjunctivists should say).

Kriegel's is an attempt to deny, one, that the object is ever immanent, and, two, that the object is ever not concrete. But, taken in conjunction with the arguments above, and the fact that a perceptual intentional state/content could not be realized without an intentional object that bears the phenomenal properties, to say that there is no immanent intentional object is either false or an equivocation (Sense-data are the intentional objects for people who believe in them. The equivocation can be put as the equivocation between calling the sense-datum and the external object that causes it the intentional object).

Given that adverbialism is false, Kriegel's intrinsically intentional phenomenal properties instantiated in perception could not exist. He would have to either hold that the phenomenal properties are not intentional, merely sensational, and that there is non-phenomenal intentionality, or hold that there are intentional objects bearing the phenomenal properties (ie the usual qualia choice). Qualia do not point: either qualia are the phenomenal properties of the intentional object or they are phenomenal properties that the perceptual state has in virtue of intending the object that it does (Kriegel's theory looks a lot like this latter option - which is bad for the latter option, a position more common than one would think).

Burge/Putnam externalist concerns are independent of these considerations. The logical structure of intentionality is neutral on what the eventual metaphysics of particular intentional objects are. If a duplicate-BIV is a phenomenal duplicate of yourself (and this appears to be possibly question-begging), this does not imply that there are not intentional objects in the logical sense. It may or may not imply that the intentional objects are sense-data in even veridical cases, that is all.