

# Problèmes de Métaphysique : Schaffer on Grounding

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Philipp Keller

philipp.keller@lettres.unige.ch

Contra Quine and with Aristotle, metaphysics is not about what exists but about what grounds what.

Different explananda :

1. what is fundamental; “diagnostics for grounding”
2. how the things that exist exist
3. which things are free lunches and which are not
4. which is the best conception of the target of metaphysical inquiry

Three arguments for ordered structure plus permissivism about existence :

1. Quinean existence questions are trivial, because they are settled by trivial existential generalisations.
2. Aristotelian fundamentality questions are interesting, because they are at stake in the following debates :
  - (a) metaphysical realism vs. idealism (mind-dependence) ;
  - (b) realism about numbers vs. constructivism (mind-dependence) ;
  - (c) realism about universals vs. nominalism (predicate-dependence) ;
  - (d) substratum vs. bundle theories of objects (ontological priority) ;
  - (e) dualistic vs. materialistic theories of mind (basing) ;
  - (f) substantival vs. relational theories of space (grounding) ;
  - (g) monistic vs. pluralistic theories of the cosmos (priority).
3. The Quinean method presupposes grounding, because the best theory is a theory of the fundamental, the canonical logic turns (in part) on what is fundamental and the apt translations are into talk of the fundamental.

Claims on the way :

1. Grounding is hyperintensional. // There are substantive grounding questions for necessary entities.
2. The ontic commitments are to the fundamental grounds plus grounding relations and what is grounded.
3. Integrated wholes, as opposed to mere aggregates, are grounding rather than grounded by their proper parts.
4. The grounding relation is well-founded.
5. There is only one substance, and everything else is abstracted from it